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RETHINKING COUNTERCYCLICAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION
Jeremy C. Kress* & Matthew C. Turkà
The 2008 financial crisis exposed a longstanding problem in
financial regulation: traditional regulatory strategies tend to
be procyclical. That is, regulatory tools—most notably, bank
capital requirements—incentivize excessive credit growth
during economic expansions and insufficient lending during
contractions. The procyclicality of U.S. financial regulation
was a key driver of the housing bubble in the mid-2000s and
the massive credit crunch that followed. To combat this
phenomenon, Congress and the federal banking agencies
attempted to mitigate procyclical boom-and-bust cycles by
implementing regulatory approaches that were explicitly
countercyclical. The Dodd-Frank Act and related post-crisis
reforms included several countercyclical features that were
designed to become stricter during periods of economic growth
and more lenient during contractions, with the goal of
smoothing economic cycles.
Less than a decade later, however, these countercyclical tools
failed to prevent unprecedented financial stress during the
COVID-19 recession. This Article is the first legal scholarship
to revisit the design of countercyclical rules in light of the
COVID-19 pandemic. It reveals weaknesses in Dodd-Frank’s
countercyclical approach and the significant costs of failing to
implement an effective countercyclical strategy. The Article also
establishes a blueprint for strengthening the United States’
countercyclical framework going forward. The Article identifies
three principles—automaticity, portfolio strategy, and market*
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wide
coverage—that
should
guide
countercyclical
policymaking. It then applies these principles to five specific
areas in which financial regulators should bolster
countercyclical oversight: bank capital requirements,
accounting standards, securitization rules, early remediation
guidelines, and margin requirements. Taken together, these
reforms are critical to making countercyclical financial
regulation work and creating a more stable and prosperous
financial system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Financial regulation has long suffered from a critical
shortcoming: traditional regulatory approaches tend to be
procyclical. That is, financial regulatory tools—most notably, bank
capital requirements—exacerbate boom-and-bust cycles by
incentivizing financial institutions to lend too much during
economic expansions and not enough during contractions.1 At no
time has this dynamic been more apparent—or more harmful—than
during the 2008 financial crisis. In the early 2000s, financial
regulations encouraged institutions to create exotic new financial
instruments and engage in excessive mortgage lending.2 When the
housing bubble burst a few years later, the same rules drove banks
to all but stop extending credit to households, businesses, and the
broader U.S. economy.3
In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, a consensus began to emerge
that in order to combat procyclicality, financial regulators should
adopt approaches that are explicitly countercyclical. Scholars urged
policymakers to counteract the boom-and-bust cycle by
implementing rules that would become stricter during periods of
economic expansion and more lenient in times of economic
contraction.4 International financial regulators likewise endorsed a
1 See Markus Behn, Rainer Haselmann & Paul Wachtel, Procyclical Capital Regulation
and Lending, 71 J. FIN. 919, 920–24 (2016) (“[W]ell-intentioned regulatory policy can amplify
business cycle fluctuation.”); Anil K Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, Cyclical Implications of the
Basel II Capital Standards, 28 ECON. PERSPS. 18, 18 (2004) (noting that capital rules may
force banks to maintain more capital during an economic downturn, thereby requiring banks
to cut back on their lending activity and “contributing to a worsening of the initial downturn”);
Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation, 26 REV.
FIN. STUD. 452, 452–53 (2013) (“In recessions, losses erode banks’ capital, while risk-based
capital requirements … become higher. If banks cannot quickly raise sufficient new capital,
their lending capacity falls and a credit crunch may follow.”).
2 See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE JOINT F., REPORT ON ASSET
SECURITISATION INCENTIVES 11–12 (2011) (contending that pre-crisis bank capital
requirements promoted securitization).
3 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE BASEL COMMITTEE’S RESPONSE TO THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS: REPORT TO THE G20, at 1 (2010) (“The crisis was exacerbated by a
procyclical deleveraging process . . . .”).
4 See Julie Andersen Hill, Bailouts and Credit Cycles: Fannie, Freddie, and the Farm Credit
System, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1, 69–72 (urging policymakers to adopt countercyclical capital
requirements for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Farm Credit System); Jonathan S. Masur
& Eric A. Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?, 34 YALE J. ON REGUL. 857, 877–79
(2017) (“[I]t is plausible that countercyclical capital regulation could have desirable
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countercyclical approach. At an emergency summit shortly after the
crisis, G20 leaders declared their intent to pursue strategies “to
mitigate pro-cyclicality.”5
The rationale for countercyclical regulation is two-fold. First,
regulatory rules that become more stringent during expansionary
cycles can prevent the economy from overheating and create a
cushion in the financial system to absorb losses when the economy
ultimately sours.6 Second, countercyclical rules allow policymakers
to loosen financial regulations during contractionary periods in
order to boost the economy without compromising financial
stability.7 Thus, effective countercyclical financial regulation can
help moderate extreme fluctuations in the economic cycle.
U.S. policymakers embraced this new approach by adopting
several countercyclical reforms in the wake of the financial crisis.
For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) expressly directed the financial
regulatory agencies to make bank capital “requirements
countercyclical, so that the amount of capital required . . . increases
in times of economic expansion and decreases in times of economic
contraction.”8 The federal banking agencies implemented this
mandate by establishing a countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB)—a
macroeconomic effects.”); Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and Its Challenges,
47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181, 1186–88, 1217 (2016) (noting that “[c]ountercyclical regulation seeks
to defuse [the] boom-and-bust cycle by making financial institutions more resilient during
financial crises” and concluding that the initial results from countercyclical regulation are
promising); Brett McDonnell, Dampening Financial Regulatory Cycles, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1597,
1607 (2013) (asserting that “financial regulation should optimally be countercyclical”).
5 SUMMIT ON FIN. MKTS. & THE WORLD ECON., ACTION PLAN TO IMPLEMENT PRINCIPLES FOR
REFORM 2 (2008), https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/g20_leaders_declaration_washingt
on_2008.pdf.
6 See McCoy, supra note 4, at 1187–88, 1193–94 (stating that an objective of countercyclical
regulation is to allow firms to build “capital reserves in good economic times . . . to cushion
them from losses when downturns strike”).
7 See Masur & Posner, supra note 4, at 868, 877–79 (asserting that countercyclically
increasing capital requirements during booms and reducing capital requirements in
recessions can “generate cost savings within an order of magnitude of automatic fiscal
stabilizers”).
8 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 616(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1615 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b)).
A parallel set of international standards published in 2010, known as Basel III, includes
similar directives. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 57–60 (2010),
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
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discretionary capital cushion the agencies may require
systemically-important banks to maintain when macroeconomic
conditions warrant.9 Other Dodd-Frank provisions—such as early
remediation requirements for distressed banks and risk retention
rules for securitizations—implicitly tracked a countercyclical logic,
as well.10
Despite these countercyclical policies, however, the U.S. financial
system remained vulnerable when the COVID-19 pandemic
emerged in early 2020. At the time, the United States was in the
midst of a decade-long expansion—the longest period of economic
growth in the nation’s history.11 Yet, by the spring of 2020,
policymakers had to inject unprecedented fiscal support and
emergency liquidity to prevent financial markets from collapsing.12
Meanwhile, the federal banking agencies rolled back regulations
and enacted a slew of forbearance policies to prevent banks from
breaching minimum requirements.13 Federal Reserve stress tests
revealed that, despite these extraordinary accommodations, onequarter of the United States’ largest banks would be unable to
maintain the required minimum level of capital in a double-dip
recession.14
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Sections III.C–D.
11 See David John Marotta, Longest Economic Expansion in United States History, FORBES
(Jan. 21, 2020, 12:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmarotta/2020/01/21/longesteconomic-expansion-in-united-states-history/ (stating that the economic expansion had
lasted for 126 months by December 2019, the longest in U.S. history).
12 See Justin Baer, The Day Coronavirus Nearly Broke the Financial Markets, WALL ST. J.
(May 20, 2020, 9:44 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-day-coronavirus-nearly-brokethe-financial-markets-11589982288 (explaining that “government programs . . . brought
markets back from the brink” after investors panicked).
13 See David Zaring, The Government’s Economic Response to the COVID Crisis, 40 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 315, 387–95 (2020) (stating that regulators announced a “panoply of
measures” that can be characterized as forbearance); see also Howell E. Jackson & Steven L.
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Stability: Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic, 11 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 193, 206–07 (2021) (explaining that forbearance was part of a range of regulatory
and supervisory accommodations in the pandemic); Graham S. Steele, The Tailors of Wall
Street, 93 U. COLO. L. REV. 993, 1026–32 (2022) (discussing regulatory forbearance during the
pandemic).
14 See Victoria Guida, Fed Suspends Stock Buybacks, Caps Dividends for Big Banks,
POLITICO (June 25, 2020, 9:05 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/25/fed-suspendsstock-buybacks-caps-dividends-for-big-banks-340803 (noting that stress tests suggested that
in a “double-dip recession scenario, roughly a quarter of banks would breach their minimum
capital requirements”).
9

10
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The U.S. financial sector’s fragility during the COVID-19
pandemic was due, in part, to the failure of the post-2008
countercyclical regulatory framework. Despite the historic economic
expansion of the 2010s, policymakers neglected to use their
countercyclical tools as intended. In some cases, the financial
regulatory agencies failed to activate discretionary countercyclical
policies.15 For example, the Federal Reserve never triggered the
CCyB despite numerous economists and former regulators urging
the central bank to do so.16 In other cases, the financial sector
successfully pushed for delays or exemptions to countercyclical
rules, such as Dodd-Frank’s early remediation requirements.17
Thus, although Dodd-Frank and other post-2008 reforms
established a countercyclical framework, the United States never
fully realized the promise of countercyclical financial regulation.
This Article is the first legal scholarship to revisit the design of
countercyclical rules in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. It
reveals the serious costs of the United States’ failure to implement
meaningful countercyclical policies during the historic economic
expansion of the 2010s. Widespread government interventions to
stabilize financial markets in early 2020 incurred substantial direct
costs.18 Even more troubling, the government’s pervasive support
for the financial system is likely to increase moral hazard and
discourage financial institutions from practicing sound risk
management in the future.19 Better countercyclical financial
regulation is therefore necessary to minimize these costs and
maintain financial stability.
This Article establishes a blueprint for strengthening the United
States’ countercyclical financial regulatory framework. It identifies
three principles that should guide countercyclical policymaking
going forward. First, policymakers should embed automatic triggers
in countercyclical rules where feasible to correct for regulators’ bias
toward inaction during expansionary periods. Second, instead of
relying exclusively or primarily on the CCyB, regulators should

See, e.g., infra notes 222–224 and accompanying text.
See infra Section II.A.
17 See infra Section II.D.
18 See infra Section IV.B.2.
19 See, e.g., John Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, 25
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 119–28 (2015) (arguing that “bailouts of specific institutions
or their creditors” increase moral hazard costs).
15
16
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adopt a portfolio of complementary countercyclical rules to mitigate
policymaking uncertainty. Finally, in contrast to Dodd-Frank’s
rules—which apply predominantly to large banks—countercyclical
policies should apply market-wide to encompass all financial
institutions that might transmit systemic risk.
Applying these principles, this Article recommends specific
countercyclical reforms U.S. policymakers should implement. It
identifies five areas in which financial regulators should bolster
countercyclical oversight: bank capital requirements,20 accounting
standards,21 securitization rules,22 early remediation guidelines,23
and margin and haircut requirements.24 Importantly, these reforms
can generally be implemented without new legislation by leveraging
the financial regulatory agencies’ existing rulemaking authority.
Taken together, these reforms are critical to making countercyclical
financial regulation work and creating a more stable and
prosperous financial system.
Skeptics contend that countercyclical financial regulation cannot
work in practice, but their arguments are unpersuasive. Federal
Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell, for example, has cast doubt on
countercyclical regulation’s efficacy.25 In Powell’s view, regulators
are unable to time countercyclical interventions appropriately to
match fluctuations in the business cycle.26 But skeptics of
countercyclical regulation ignore that economists have identified
reliable macroeconomic indicators to signal when countercyclical
adjustments are warranted.27 Critics also overlook the fact that
See infra Section V.B.1.
See infra Section V.B.2.
22 See infra Section V.B.3.
23 See infra Section V.B.4.
24 See infra Section V.B.5.
25 Fed. Rsrv., FOMC Press Conference, January 27, 2021, YOUTUBE (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R8wxdyEULtg (“[W]e rely on . . . always-on, through-thecycle macroprudential policy tools . . . . We don’t use time-varying . . . tools as some other
countries do. And we think it’s a good approach because—for us to use [tools] that are alwayson—because we don’t really think we’d be successful in every case in picking the exact right
time to intervene . . . .”).
26 See id. (indicating uncertainty about whether regulators could properly determine when
to intervene in the market).
27 See generally David Aikman, Michael T. Kiley, Seung Jung Lee, Michael G. Palumbo &
Missaka N. Warusawitharana, Mapping Heat in the U.S. Financial System (Divs. Rsch. &
Stat. & Monetary Affs., Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No.
2015-059, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/files/2015059pap.pdf
20
21
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other jurisdictions—including France, Germany, and Hong Kong—
successfully implemented a countercyclical approach after the 2008
crisis and were therefore better prepared than the United States to
withstand the COVID-19 pandemic’s economic impact.28
It is especially urgent that policymakers implement effective
countercyclical financial regulation because the United States’ new
approach to monetary policy intensifies risks in financial markets.
In mid-2020, the Federal Reserve adopted a new “lower-for-longer”
monetary policy framework: the central bank committed to
maintaining rock-bottom interest rates despite rising inflation until
the United States achieves maximum employment.29 As Federal
Reserve officials acknowledged, persistently low interest rates may
lead to the development of asset bubbles and other financial
stability risks.30 In light of this new “lower-for-longer” approach,
policymakers must use countercyclical financial regulation to
address emerging financial risks and ensure that the next economic
contraction is less disorderly than the previous two.31
(“develop[ing] an algorithmic approach to monitoring vulnerabilities” in the financial sector);
Mathias Drehmann, Claudio Borio, Leonardo Gambacorta, Gabriel Jiménez, and Carlos
Trucharte, Countercyclical Capital Buffers: Exploring Options (Bank for Int’l Settlements,
Working Paper No. 317, 2010), https://www.bis.org/publ/work317.pdf (identifying
macroeconomic indicators to guide countercyclical regulatory judgments). An effective
countercyclical approach would embrace what Professor Hilary Allen calls the “precautionary
principle”—erring on the side of activating financial stability safeguards, even if that means
overregulating in some circumstances. Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial
Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 173, 191 (2013).
28 See infra Section II.A.
29 See Jeanna Smialek, Fed Chair Sets Stage for Longer Periods of Lower Rates, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/27/business/economy/federal-reserveinflation-jerome-powell.html (“[T]he chair of the Federal Reserve[] announced a major shift
in how the central bank guides the economy, signaling it will make job growth pre-eminent
and will not raise interest rates to guard against coming inflation just because the
unemployment rate is low.”).
30 See, e.g., Lael Brainard, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Bringing the
Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy into Alignment with LongerRun
Changes
in
the
Economy
8
(Sept.
1,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/brainard20200901a.pdf
(“The
resulting expectation of lower-for-longer interest rates . . . is conducive to increasing risk
appetite, reach-for-yield behavior, and incentives for leverage—which can boost financial
imbalances as an expansion extends.”).
31 See James Politi, Federal Reserve Debates Tougher Regulation to Prevent Asset Bubbles,
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/5c2b7d15-7e37-475a-8d421e8e0a3b8708 (“Officials worry that low interest-rate policies could encourage excessive risktaking.”).
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part II presents the theoretical
case for countercyclical financial regulation and explains how the
2008 financial crisis demonstrated the need for a countercyclical
regulatory approach. Part III then analyzes policymakers’ attempts
to establish a countercyclical framework in the wake of the crisis
and the ways in which those efforts ultimately fell short. Part IIV
examines how the lack of effective countercyclical regulation during
the historic 2010s economic expansion ultimately undermined
policymakers’ response to the COVID-19 recession. Finally, Part V
proposes guiding principles and specific tools for strengthening the
United States’ countercyclical regulatory framework. The Article
concludes that these reforms are essential for preserving long-term
financial stability and economic prosperity.

II. THE 2008 CRISIS AND THE CASE FOR COUNTERCYCLICAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION
Traditional financial regulatory strategies tend to be procyclical.
That is, they amplify fluctuations in the economic cycle by
encouraging banks to lend too much during economic expansions
and too little during economic contractions. The 2008 financial crisis
demonstrated the risks of procyclicality when financial
regulations—most
notably,
bank
capital
requirements—
contributed to the creation and eventual collapse of a nationwide
housing bubble. In response to the 2008 crisis, scholars and
policymakers proposed to mitigate financial regulation’s inherent
procyclicality by incorporating countercyclical strategies into the
U.S. regulatory framework. At least in theory, a countercyclical
approach can help moderate economic fluctuations by
strengthening regulation during boom times and relaxing oversight
during downturns. This Part explains why traditional financial
regulation tends to be procyclical, how procyclicality contributed to
the 2008 crisis, and why countercyclical financial regulation is an
appropriate policy response.
Bank capital requirements are a classic example of how wellintentioned financial regulations can backfire by creating
procyclicality. Generally speaking, bank capital is analogous to
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equity.32 Thus, the more capital that a bank maintains, the less
likely it is to become insolvent and inflict losses on depositors, other
creditors, and the banking system as a whole.33 As a result,
regulators have typically required banks to maintain a minimum
level of capital as a cushion to absorb losses.34 For example, in the
lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis, regulators required most banks
to maintain a simple leverage ratio—calculated as a bank’s capital
divided by its total assets—of at least 3%.35
A static minimum capital requirement—such as a 3% leverage
ratio—appears to provide a neutral standard. In practice, however,
it indirectly biases the measure of a bank’s health because it does
not account for fluctuations in asset prices over the business cycle.36
This bias works in both directions. During an economic expansion,
a bank’s assets rise in value, boosting its equity and making its
capital levels appear artificially high.37 During a recession,
however, the same portfolio of assets depreciates, shrinking the
bank’s equity and yielding a lower level of capital.38 The magnitude

32 See MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL
REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 265 (2d ed. 2018) (“In functional and simplified terms, capital
measures the amount of losses that an institution can suffer without impairing its obligations
to creditors and other claimants.”).
33 See id. at 266 (“An institution with a greater reliance on capital will have a larger cushion
against losses . . . .”).
34 For a discussion of the historical evolution of bank capital requirements, see generally
DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REGULATION (2008).
35 To comply with a 3% leverage capital requirement, a bank must maintain at least $3
worth of equity for every $97 worth of debt. See BARR ET AL., supra note 32, at 265–67.
(explaining leverage ratios).
36 See Repullo & Suarez, supra note 1, at 452 (“[I]n recessions, losses erode banks’ capital,
while risk-based capital requirements . . . become higher. If banks cannot quickly raise
sufficient new capital, their lending capacity falls and a credit crunch may follow.”); see also
Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, A Macroprudential Approach to
Financial Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 7–9 (2011) (presenting “time-varying capital
requirements” as an alternative to static minimums because of the negative implications
associated with the latter).
37 See BARR ET AL., supra note 32, at 265–67 (discussing the relationship between capital
and equity); Linda Allen & Anthony Saunders, A Survey of Cyclical Effects in Credit Risk
Measurement Models 2 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 126, 2003),
https://www.bis.org/publ/work126.pdf (“[G]ood economic times provide the rising tide that
lifts even the shakiest of financial boats.”).
38 See Repullo & Suarez, supra note 1, at 452 (“In recessions, losses erode banks’ capital,
while risk-based capital requirements . . . become higher.”).
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of this distortion is substantial and well-documented. According to
a 2003 study by Professors Anil Kashyap and Jeremy Stein, a timeinvariant capital ratio overstates the level of bank capital by
approximately 30% to 45%.39 Other studies by financial economists
from the early 2000s find similar results.40
The procyclicality of bank capital requirements is not simply a
matter of measurement error. It also introduces serious problems
for financial stability. When a recession hits, asset write-downs
erode a bank’s equity, potentially threatening its ability to satisfy
minimum regulatory capital requirements. Declining equity leaves
the bank with two options to remain in compliance. One strategy is
to raise more capital. In the midst of a recession however, however,
issuing equity to private investors is usually considered
impracticable due to risk-averse investors and limited demand.41
The bank’s second option to offset its declining equity is to shrink
its asset portfolio and thereby reduce the denominator of its capital
ratio.42 This strategy can be achieved in two ways. First, the bank
can sell its existing assets, also known as “deleveraging.”
Alternatively, the bank may pull back from making new loans.43
Unfortunately, both of these strategies impose costs on the broader
financial system. Deleveraging is problematic because banks’ asset
portfolios consist of illiquid, long-term loans that generally cannot
be sold on short notice for full value.44 An economic contraction that

Kashyap & Stein, supra note 1, at 19.
See Eva Catarineu-Rabell, Patricia Jackson & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos, Procyclicality and
the New Basel Accord – Banks’ Choice of Loan Rating System, 26 ECON. THEORY 537, 538
(2005) (finding “a 40% to 50% increase in capital requirements” associated with the 1990–
1992 recession); Linda Allen & Anthony Saunders, A Survey of Cyclical Effects in Credit Risk
Measurement Models 1 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 126, 2003),
https://www.bis.org/publ/work126.pdf (“[O]verly optimistic estimates of default risk during
boom times reinforces the natural tendency of banks to overlend . . . .”).
41 See MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER, ANDREW CROCKET, CHARLES GOODHART, AVINASH D.
PERSAUD & HYUN SHIN et al., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION,
GENEVA REPORTS ON THE WORLD ECONOMY NO. 11, at 1010 (Jan. 6, 2009) (“Raising new
equity is notoriously difficult in distressed market conditions.”).
42 See id. at 20–21 (explaining that a borrower can sell its assets to respond to declining
equity). A third option to offset declining equity is to retain earnings, but this route may not
be available if a bank is unprofitable during times of stress.
43 See Repullo & Suarez, supra note 1, at 452 (noting that banks without an ability to raise
more capital will be forced to reduce their lending capacity).
44 See Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Fear of Fire Sales, Illiquidity Seeking,
and Credit Freezes, 126 Q. J. ECON. 557, 557 (2011) (“A financial crisis, especially one that
39
40

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

13

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 [2021], Art. 2

508

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:495

leads many banks to engage in fire sales at the same time can
generate a vicious cycle, which accelerates the downward spiral in
asset prices that caused banks to deleverage in the first place.45
Meanwhile, banks that choose to curtail new lending further impair
the economy because households and businesses need access to
credit the most during recessionary times.46 Procyclicality, in sum,
is a vexing unintended consequence of modern financial
regulation.47
The 2008 financial crisis provided direct evidence of the
procyclical effects of bank capital rules. As the U.S. housing bubble
inflated during the early 2000s, housing assets appreciated rapidly,
and banks reported rising capital ratios.48 These large equity
cushions, in turn, allowed banks to invest more in the housing
market, adding more fuel to the bubble.49 When the housing market
began to sour in 2007, however, the process reversed: as prices fell,
banks suffered write-downs on mortgage assets, and their capital
embeds fears of a potential future liquidity shock, in which highly leveraged financial
institutions will be forced to sell illiquid assets at fire sale prices, can lead to a variety of
seemingly perverse behaviors . . . .”); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance
and Macroeconomics, 25 J. ECON. PERSPS. 29, 42 (2011) (explaining that deleveraging through
sale of assets can “drive the prices of those assets below fundamental value”).
45 See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 41, at 22 (defining the “fire-sale externality” as
occurring when “fire-sales by some institutions spillover, and adversely affect the balance
sheet of others, causing a negative externality”); Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity
Black Holes, 8 REV. FIN. 1, 2 (2004) (“Market distress can feed on itself. When asset prices
fall, some traders may get close to their loss limits and are induced to sell. But this selling
pressure sets off further downward pressure on asset prices, which induces a further round
of selling, and so on.”).
46 See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 41, at 5 (“Instead of, or as well as, selling financial
assets to regain liquidity, and to improve capital ratios, a bank . . . may seek to restrict new
credit extension . . . . Thus there is yet a further self-amplifying spiral whereby credit
restriction weakens the economy, which leads to more default and asset price declines, which
causes yet more credit restrictions.”).
47 For further discussion of procyclicality in financial regulation, see ERIK F. GERDING, LAW,
BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 311–28 (2014).
48 See Bank Capital to Total Assets for United States, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDSI03USA156NWDB (last updated Oct. 21, 2019)
(reporting that the ratio of U.S. bank capital to total assets increased from 9.2% to 10.5%
between 2003 and 2006).
49 See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 106–07 (2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPOFCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (discussing Wachovia’s 2006 acquisition of subprime mortgage
lender Golden West).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss2/2

14

Kress and Turk: Rethinking Countercyclical Financial Regulation

2022] RETHINKING COUNTERCYCLICAL REGULATION

509

levels drew closer to their minimum legal requirements.50
Predictably, declining capital ratios caused financial institutions to
pull back on lending.51 They also resorted to emergency fire sales,
increased margin calls, and made related balance sheet
adjustments.52 These activities increased the fragility of the
banking system, froze credit markets, and deepened the severity of
the financial crisis.53
While some banks successfully scrambled to satisfy their
minimum capital requirements during the crisis, many others
became insolvent, further compounding the economic contraction.
Between 2008 and 2013, nearly 500—or approximately one out of
every sixteen—U.S. banks failed.54 Other banks only survived
thanks to unprecedented bailouts administered under the Treasury
Department’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and
associated rescue measures financed by Congress.55
The 2008 financial crisis was catastrophic for the U.S. and global
economies. It was also perceived as a black eye for policymakers and
economists, many of whom had downplayed the possibility of a

50 See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 41, at 15 (demonstrating how the cyclical process
often leads to “attempts by individual institutions to remain solvent [that] can push the
system into collapse” and suggesting that this occurred in 2007 and 2008).
51 See Victoria Ivashina & David Scharfstein, Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of
2008, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 319, 321 (2010) (“The decline in new loans accelerated during the
banking panic. In the fourth quarter of 2008, the dollar volume of lending was 47% lower
than it was in the prior quarter and the number of issues was 33% lower than it was in the
prior quarter.”).
52 See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008,
23 J. ECON. PERSPS. 77, 85 (2009) (discussing fire sales during 2007).
53 See id. (“At that time, the perceived default and liquidity risks of banks rose significantly,
driving up the LIBOR [London Interbank Offered Rate]. In response to the freezing up of the
interbank market on August 9, the European Central Bank injected €95 billion in overnight
credit into the interbank market.”).
54 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CRISIS AND RESPONSE: AN FDIC HISTORY, 2008–2013, at 119
(2017), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/crisis/crisis-complete.pdf.
55 Although the TARP returned a nominal profit to the U.S. Treasury, the program did not
adequately compensate taxpayers for the risks the program assumed. See Thomas Flanagan
& Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Did Banks Pay “Fair” Returns to Taxpayers on TARP? 33 (Mar.
23, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3595763 (concluding that
TARP benefited shareholders at the expense of taxpayers). The TARP program was mainly
directed at larger banks. For a review of financial rescue measures extended to smaller banks,
see Jeremy C. Kress & Matthew C. Turk, Too Many to Fail: Against Community Bank
Deregulation, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 647, 651, 659–63 (2020).
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severe crash.56 Perhaps the lone bright spot, from the latter
perspective, was a vindication of economic research that warned of
procyclical distortions caused by pre-crisis capital regulation.57
Rarely are abstract social science models proven by real world
events so decisively.
The basic logic of countercyclical regulation is straightforward.
To smooth fluctuations in the economic cycle, countercyclical theory
suggests that regulatory restrictions should tighten during
economic booms and relax during economic contractions.58 By
intensifying restrictions during good times, policymakers can
prevent the economy from overheating and ensure that firms build
sufficient financial resources to withstand the inevitable

56 Compare Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Remarks at the Meetings of the
Eastern
Economic
Association:
The
Great
Moderation
(Feb.
20,
2004),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040220/ (“My view is that
improvements in monetary policy, though certainly not the only factor, have probably been
an important source of the Great Moderation. In particular, I am not convinced that the
decline in macroeconomic volatility of the past two decades was primarily the result of good
luck . . . .”), with RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 117–18 (2009) (“[I]t seems unlikely that such experts on the
business cycle as the Federal Reserve’s chairman, Ben Bernanke, are constrained to base
their predictions on naïve extrapolation. This makes his neglect, and that of other experts
both inside and outside the government, of warning signs of a coming crash extremely
puzzling.”). For further insights, see Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of
Eng., Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 366th Economic Policy
The
Dog
and
the
Frisbee
1
(Aug.
31,
2012),
Symposium:
https://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf (“No regulator had the foresight to predict the
financial crisis, although some have since exhibited supernatural powers of hindsight.”); and
John Tamny, If they Tell you they Predicted the Financial Crisis, They’re Lying, FORBES (Oct.
8, 2013, 2:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johntamny/2013/10/08/if-they-tell-you-theypredicted-the-financial-crisis-theyre-lying/?sh=2e13a87567a2 (“What about those people
whom we all know who kept telling us that housing was headed for a collapse in the years
leading up 2007 and 2008. Did they predict a crisis? No, they did not.”).
57 See Masur & Posner, supra note 4, at 878 (“Even before the financial crisis, financial
economists worried about the macroeconomic effects of this approach [to capital
requirements]. The financial crisis shows that these worries were justified.” (footnote
omitted)).
58 See McCoy, supra note 4, at 1181 (“[F]inancial regulation would be more effective if
financial regulation clamped down during financial expansions and lightened up during
economic slumps . . . .”).
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downturn.59 By contrast, loosening rules during economic
contractions may spur economic growth and kick-start a recovery.60
Countercyclical rules can, in principle, be applied in any area of
the law and are not necessarily limited to financial regulation.61 The
most familiar example comes from monetary policy.62 Central banks
typically do not hold the money supply constant over the business
cycle. Instead, central banks lower interest rates during a recession
to stimulate economic activity and then raise rates during the
recovery to prevent the economy from “overheating.”63 By varying
their regulatory target over time, central banks aim to reduce
volatility in the business cycle and ensure more stable economic
growth over the long term.64
At least in theory, countercyclical financial regulation could work
the same way. Financial regulators could ratchet up rules as the
economy expands, curbing excess credit growth and forcing banks
59 See id. at 1184–85 (“[R]egulation during asset bubbles can leave financial institutions
with insufficient capital and reserves to survive a market crash. . . . Countercyclical
regulation responds by designing rules that become binding at the top of the business cycle,
when financial firms are profitable and catastrophic risks seem small . . . .”).
60 See id. at 1185 (“Countercyclical regulation . . . eas[es] regulation at the bottom of the
business cycle in order to stimulate the economy.”).
61 See Masur & Posner, supra note 4, at 873–77 (exploring how countercyclical regulation
could be applied in a number of contexts, including environmental law, consumer protection,
workplace safety, and immigration law); Aneil Kovvali, Countercyclical Corporate
Governance, 101 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 56–64),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4043883 (exploring the potential of
countercyclical corporate governance schemes); Tianna Larson, Note, Countercyclial
Antitakeover Policy, 21 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INT’L PROP. L. 319, 360–376 (2021) (proposing
a countercyclical approach to antitakeover law).
62 See Masur & Posner, supra note 4, at 862–65 (discussing the frequent intervention by
the Federal Reserve, aiming to “reduce variance in economic growth”); see also McCoy, supra
note 4, at 1196–99 (presenting debates on the countercyclical role of monetary policy).
63 See Masur & Posner, supra note 4, at 862 (“Monetary policy takes place through the
central bank, the Federal Reserve (‘Fed’). As an economy enters recession, the Fed attempts
to lower market interest rates. . . . As the economy leaves recession and heats up, the Fed
reverses course . . . .”).
64 See id. (“The goal [of central bank monetary policy] is to reduce variance in economic
growth, as well as manage inflation and mitigate cyclical unemployment . . . .”); see also Ben
S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy
Transmission, 9 J. ECON. PERSPS. 27, 27 (1995) (“According to many textbooks, monetary
policymakers use their leverage over short-term interest rates to influence the cost of capital
and, consequently, spending on durable goods, such as fixed investment, housing, inventories
and consumer durables. In turn, changes in aggregate demand affect the level of
production.”).
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to maintain bigger buffers. Then, when the economic cycle turns,
regulators could relax limits and thereby encourage banks to
continue lending despite the contracting economy. In this way,
countercyclical strategies could combat the procyclicality embedded
in the traditional financial regulatory framework.
Effective countercyclical financial regulation might have
mitigated—or entirely avoided—the 2008 crisis. If pre-crisis capital
requirements were structured to allow for upward adjustments in
response to the housing bubble that inflated over the previous
decade, banks would have had a larger equity cushion as the bubble
burst and thus been more likely to remain solvent during the
downturn. Indeed, David Aikman and co-authors estimated that a
3% CCyB would have obviated the need for the TARP capital
injections during the 2008 financial crisis.65 If banks had been
required to build up an extra capital cushion as the bubble inflated,
regulators could have relaxed capital requirements when the
housing bubble popped and allowed banks to use that additional
capital to stabilize the economy. Similarly, banks could have used
their additional capital buffers to acquire failing nonbank financial
companies—such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers—with less
government support. Thus, with effective countercyclical
regulation, the U.S. housing bubble and ensuing economic collapse
could have been much less dramatic.
Given the promising theory behind countercyclical financial
regulation, scholars and policymakers embraced countercyclical
strategies in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. As Congress began
drafting Dodd-Frank and international financial regulators revised
global bank capital standards, it was widely recognized that
countercyclical regulation would become a cornerstone of post-crisis
policy reforms.66 As the next Part demonstrates, however, while
policymakers attempted to implement countercyclical strategies,
their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful.

65 See David Aikman, Jonathan Bridges, Anil Kashyap & Caspar Siegert, Would
Macroprudential Regulation Have Prevented the Last Crisis?, 33 J. ECON. PERSPS. 107, 117
(2019) (“Had a countercyclical capital buffer of 3 percent been built-up in the run-up to the
crisis, it would have, in effect, brought the capital raising that ultimately proved necessary
forward in time, substituting public provision of capital for private sector resources.”).
66 See SUMMIT ON FIN. MKTS. & THE WORLD ECON., DECLARATION 3–4 (2008),
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/g20_leaders_declaration_washington_2008.pdf
(declaring international policymakers’ intent to pursue countercyclical strategies).
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III. POST-CRISIS COUNTERCYCLICAL REGULATION: LESSONS
(ALMOST) LEARNED
In response to the 2008 crisis, U.S. policymakers adopted a series
of countercyclical regulatory reforms. Key elements of Dodd-Frank
and other post-crisis rules were expressly designed to intensify
during expansionary periods and abate during times of stress.
Despite policymakers’ intentions, however, these reforms were
ultimately implemented in a way that failed to achieve their
countercyclical aims. In some cases, the financial regulatory
agencies failed to activate discretionary countercyclical tools during
the late 2010s expansion; in other cases, the financial sector
successfully pushed for delays in or exemptions to countercyclical
rules. This Part examines four elements of the post-crisis regulatory
framework—bank capital requirements, accounting standards,
securitization rules, and early remediation requirements—that
were supposed to be countercyclical. It also explains how each fell
short in practice.
A. COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS

Most notably, policymakers tried to make bank capital
requirements countercyclical. A bank’s capital is the financial buffer
available to absorb losses and protect the bank from insolvency.67
Before the 2008 crisis, the United States’ bank capital requirements
were static: banks had to maintain the same minimum capital
ratios regardless of economic conditions.68 After the crisis, Congress
directed the federal banking agencies to convert this static capital
framework into one that adjusts countercyclically. Specifically,
Section 616 of Dodd-Frank instructs the banking agencies “to make
[bank] capital standards . . . countercyclical so that the amount of
capital required to be maintained by an insured depository
institution increases in times of economic expansion and decreases

67 See BARR ET AL., supra note 32, at 265–67 (illustrating how capital protects institutions
from insolvency).
68 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 6.4(b)(2), 208.43(b)(2), 325.103(b)(2) (2006) (requiring a bank to
maintain at least a 4% Tier 1 and 8% total risk-based capital ratio, as well as a 4% leverage
ratio).
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in times of economic contraction.”69 In response, the regulatory
agencies established a new tool to implement this mandate: the
countercyclical capital buffer.70 As the U.S. economy expanded in
the late 2010s, however, the regulatory agencies opted not to
activate this discretionary buffer, thereby leaving the banking
sector vulnerable when the COVID-19 pandemic hit.71
At least in theory, the CCyB is well designed to achieve
countercyclical regulatory goals. The CCyB is an extra buffer of up
to 2.5% common equity Tier 1 capital that the banking agencies can
require systemically important banks to maintain at the agencies’
discretion, as macroeconomic and financial stability conditions
warrant.72 When activated, this additional capital cushion serves
two purposes. First, the accumulation of an extra capital buffer
during expansionary periods increases the resilience of the banking
system during economic downturns.73 Second, by forcing banks to
maintain more capital during economic expansions, the CCyB could
slow the growth of credit bubbles and help prevent the economy
from overheating in the first place.74 The agencies cited both of these
justifications when they adopted the CCyB framework in 2013.75

69 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 616(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1615–16 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §
3907(a)(1)). The statute contains a parallel requirement for bank holding company capital
requirements. Id. § 616(a) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §1844(b)).
70 See Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, 78 Fed.
Reg. 62,018, 62,037–40 (Oct. 11, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 3.11(b), 217.11(b), 324.11(b)
(2021)) (implementing the countercyclical buffer).
71 See Reuters Staff, Fed Keeps Countercyclical Capital Buffer at Zero, REUTERS (Dec. 18,
2020, 5:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-buffer-idUSKBN28S31S (noting
that the Federal Reserve has never triggered the buffer).
72 See id. at 62,038–39 (explaining the buffer). The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision—an international standard-setting body—adopted the CCyB as part of its postcrisis Basel III reforms, and most developed countries have implemented the CCyB within
their jurisdictions. See Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCYB), BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/ccyb/ (last updated Dec. 17, 2020) (discussing the Basel III
countercyclical buffer and listing the countries that have adopted it).
73 See Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 62,038 (explaining that the buffer would “absorb the above-normal losses that a
banking organization likely would face” during a downturn).
74 See id. (“[A] countercyclical capital buffer also may reduce systemic vulnerabilities and
protect the banking system by mitigating excessive credit growth and increases in asset
prices that are not supported by fundamental factors.”).
75 Id.
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After implementing the CCyB regulation, the Federal Reserve
established guidelines for when it would activate the buffer and
what factors it would consider when setting the CCyB. In a policy
statement, the Federal Reserve explained that it would activate the
CCyB “when systemic vulnerabilities are meaningfully above
normal.”76 Federal Reserve Governor Lael Brainard interpreted this
statement to mean that “the criterion for raising the CCyB above its
minimum value of zero is that financial risks are assessed to be in
the upper one-third of their historical distribution.”77 In assessing
financial sector vulnerabilities, the Federal Reserve stated that it
“intends to monitor a wide range of financial and macroeconomic
quantitative indicators including, but not limited to, measures of
relative credit and liquidity expansion or contraction, a variety of
asset prices, funding spreads, credit condition surveys, . . . and
measures of systemic risk.”78 The Federal Reserve committed to
voting annually on whether to activate the CCyB and, if so, at what
level to set the buffer.79
As the economic expansion of the 2010s progressed, pressure
grew on the Federal Reserve to activate the CCyB. Many other

76 Regulatory Capital Rules: The Federal Reserve Board’s Framework for Implementing
the U.S. Basel III Countercyclical Capital Buffer, 81 Fed. Reg. 63,682, 63,682 (Sept. 16, 2016)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 app. A (2021)). The Federal Reserve elaborated that it would
consider financial system vulnerabilities to be “meaningfully above normal” when
vulnerabilities “were either already at, or expected to build to, levels sufficient to generate
material unexpected losses in the event of an unfavorable development in financial markets
or the economy.” Id. at 63,684.
77 Lael Brainard, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks at the Center
for Global Economy and Business, Stern School of Business: An Update on the Federal
Reserve’s Financial Stability Agenda 10 (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/files/brainard20180403a.pdf.
78 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 app. A § 4(b).
79 Id. § 5(a).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

21

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 [2021], Art. 2

516

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:495

jurisdictions—including France,80 Germany,81 and Hong Kong82—
increased their countercyclical buffers. In the United States,
numerous economists and policymakers urged the Federal Reserve
to activate the CCyB in light of escalating risks.83 In 2019, for
example, former Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen urged the
central bank to turn on the buffer, saying, “I am concerned that
asset valuations . . . are elevated and I see dangers relating to the
large volume [of] leveraged lending . . . . Raising the [CCyB] now
would improve the resilience of the banking system, enabling it to
better weather a future downturn.”84 Several regional Federal
Reserve Bank presidents echoed Yellen’s assessment.85
80 See David Keohane, France Tells Banks to Set Aside More Capital, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 18,
2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/5c575cfc-49a5-11e9-8b7f-d49067e0f50d
(describing
France’s decision to raise its CCyB from .25% to .5% out of concern that “credit in the country
might be growing too quickly”).
81 See Reuters Staff, Germany Planning to Set 0.25% Countercyclical Capital Buffer for
Banks, REUTERS (May 27, 2019, 8:24 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/germanybanks/germany-planning-to-set-0-25-countercyclical-capital-buffer-for-banksidUSS8N21S03D (describing the Germany Financial Stability Board’s recommendation for a
.25% CCyB as a precaution).
82 See Press Release, Hong Kong Monetary Auth., Monetary Authority Announces
Countercyclical
Capital
Buffer
for
Hong
Kong
(Jan.
10,
2018),
https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/press-releases/2018/01/20180110-4/
(explaining that an increase in the buffer from 1.875% to 2.5% was necessary to avoid
systemic risk to the Hong Kong economy).
83 See, e.g., Jason Furman, Opinion, The Fed Should Raise Rates, but Not the Ones You’re
Thinking, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2018, 6:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fed-shouldraise-rates-but-not-the-ones-youre-thinking-1534803795 (“It’s high time for the Fed to raise
countercyclical capital-buffer rates . . . . [Doing so] would reduce the risk of financial
instability, set a precedent for sound macroeconomic management, and build up a bigger
cushion for the next downturn.”); Press Release, Sen. Sherrod Brown, Brown Statement on
Federal
Reserve’s
Vote
Against
Big
Bank
Safeguards
(Mar.
8,
2019),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/minority/brown-statement-on-federal-reservesvote-against-big-bank-safeguards (“I’m disappointed with the Fed’s decision to not raise the
countercyclical capital buffer . . . . Banks are doing well, but there are certainly growing risks
in the economy.” ); Bloomberg Daybreak: Americas, Sheila Bair: Banks Stronger Than Before
Crisis, but Not Strong Enough, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2019, 10:11 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2019-06-27/sheila-bair-banks-stronger-than-beforecrisis-but-not-strong-enough-video?sref=S5RPfkRP (urging the Federal Reserve to activate
the buffer).
84 Janet L. Yellen, Seven Questions for Janet Yellen on Financial Stability, BROOKINGS
(Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/01/03/seven-questions-forjanet-yellen-on-financial-stability/.
85 See Greg Robb, Fed Votes Not to Impose Capital Buffer on Banks, MARKETWATCH (Mar.
7, 2019, 9:36 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/fed-votes-not-to-impose-capital-
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Despite these entreaties, the Federal Reserve consistently
declined to activate the CCyB. Beginning in 2016, the Federal
Reserve voted annually to maintain the buffer at 0%.86 Federal
Reserve policymakers acknowledged some increasing risks in the
financial system, including elevated asset prices relative to
underlying fundamentals and “historically high” borrowing by
businesses relative to gross domestic product.87 Nonetheless, the
Federal Reserve’s Vice Chair for Supervision, Randal Quarles,
concluded that “[t]he overall risk to financial stability is swamped
by the extremely low leverage in the financial sector.”88 Thus,
Quarles asserted on behalf of the Federal Reserve Board in March
2019 that “we do not see financial stability concerns as elevated.”89
buffer-on-banks-2019-03-06 (noting that at least three Federal Reserve Bank presidents
supported activating the CCyB).
86 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board Announces
It Has Voted to Affirm Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) at Current Level of 0 Percent
(Oct.
24,
2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
bcreg20161024a.htm; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve
Board Announces It Has Voted to Affirm Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) at Current
Level of 0 Percent (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
pressreleases/bcreg20171201a.htm; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
Federal Reserve Board Votes to Affirm the Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) at the
Current Level of 0 Percent (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20190306c.htm.
87 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 7 (2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20191115.pdf.
88 Lalita Clozel, Fed Considers New Tool for a Downturn, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2019, 9:00
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-considers-new-tool-for-a-downturn-11565614800
(quoting Federal Reserve Vice Chair for Supervision Randal Quarles).
89 Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chairman for Supervision, Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks at the
Economic Club of New York 21 (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.econclubny.org/
documents/10184/109144/2018QuarlesTranscript.pdf. Quarles also insisted that the Federal
Reserve should not activate the CCyB because the United States sets its baseline capital
requirements higher than other jurisdictions, and thus, the U.S. CCyB is “always on.” Jeanna
Smialek, Peter Eavis & Emily Flitter, Banks Want Efficiency. Critics Warn of Backsliding.,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/business/bank-regulationfederal-reserve.html. This argument, however, misreads history. When the Federal Reserve
adopted its CCyB framework in 2016, it expressly envisioned activating the countercyclical
buffer “to augment minimum capital requirements . . . when systemic vulnerabilities are
somewhat above normal.” Regulatory Capital Rules: The Federal Reserve Board’s
Framework for Implementing the U.S. Basel III Countercyclical Capital Buffer, 81 Fed. Reg.
63,682, 63,682 (Sept. 16, 2016) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 app. A (2021)). Quarles’ argument
that the U.S. CCyB is “always on” ignores the Federal Reserve’s original intent to use the
CCyB as an additional capital buffer, regardless of how U.S. minimum capital requirements
compare to those of other jurisdictions.
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Governor Brainard dissented from this view, citing escalating
risks.90 She maintained that the Board should activate the CCyB
because the buffer “was intended to be used for precisely these kinds
of circumstances.”91 Notwithstanding Governor Brainard’s dissent,
however, the CCyB remained in disuse, even as the late 2010s
economic expansion reached historic levels.92
Nor did the Federal Reserve’s annual stress tests fulfill DoddFrank’s countercyclical capital mandate. Since the 2008 financial
crisis, the Federal Reserve has subjected the largest bank holding
companies to yearly stress tests that assess how each firm would
perform in a hypothetical economic downturn.93 Firms that fare
poorly on the stress tests generally must limit their capital
distributions to shareholders and bonus payments to executives.94

Paul Kiernan, Fed’s Brainard Urges More Action Against Financial Risks, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 20, 2019, 12:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-brainard-urges-more-actionagainst-financial-risks-11574269613 (noting that Governor Brainard did not believe that the
Federal Reserve’s actions were sufficient to counter “low interest rates and heightened
economic uncertainty”).
91 Id. (quoting Federal Reserve Governor Lael Brainard).
92 See America’s Economic Expansion Is Now the Longest on Record, ECONOMIST (July 2,
2019), https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/07/02/americas-economic-expansionis-now-the-longest-on-record (“As of today, the economic expansion that began in America in
June 2009 has continued, uninterrupted, for more than 120 months . . . making it the longest
in history.”); supra note 86.
93 See Matthew C. Turk, Stress Testing the Banking Agencies, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1701, 1713–
15 (2020) (detailing the stress test procedures instituted by Dodd-Frank); Mehrsa Baradaran,
Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1283–94 (2014) (“The stress tests were
envisioned as a diagnostic endeavor to determine which firms could withstand the next crisis
and which could not.”); Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing
Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2236, 2291–94 (2014) (“To many in the financial community,
the stress tests’ purpose was plainly to reassure the public of the solvency of the [financial]
sector.”).
94 Originally, firms that did not satisfy minimum capital requirements under the severely
adverse economic scenario “failed” the stress tests and were barred from making capital
distributions. Turk, supra note 93, at 1714. In 2020, the Federal Reserve amended its stress
testing framework by introducing a “stress capital buffer” roughly equivalent to the difference
between a company’s actual capital ratio and its stressed capital ratio. See Press Release, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board Approves Rule to Simplify Its
Capital Rules for Large Banks, Preserving the Strong Capital Requirements Already in Place
(Mar.
4,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200304a.htm.
A
firm
generally must maintain sufficient capital to satisfy its minimum capital requirements plus
its stress capital buffer to avoid limitations on capital distributions and executive bonus
payments. See id.
90
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Commentators have observed that certain elements of the stress
tests could mitigate procyclicality in bank capital requirements.95
But the stress tests are not a countercyclical tool. Indeed, the
Federal Reserve’s stress testing policy statement affirms that “[t]he
purpose of the stress test scenarios is to make sure that the
companies are properly capitalized to withstand severe economic
and financial conditions, not to serve as an explicit countercyclical
offset to the financial system.”96 In fact, Federal Reserve research
has demonstrated that constructing hypothetical economic
scenarios sufficiently adverse to achieve countercyclical outcomes
would likely be infeasible.97 Thus, the Federal Reserve’s stress tests
are no substitute for the CCyB—perhaps financial regulators’ most
powerful countercyclical tool.

As former Federal Reserve officials Donald Kohn and Nellie Liang explained, “In the
[stress test] scenarios, certain critical variables—importantly the unemployment rate—are
stressed to at least a minimum level of 10 percent each year, which implies that the lower
(higher) the current unemployment rate, the greater (lesser) the increase and hence degree
of stress.” DONALD KOHN & NELLIE LIANG, UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF THE U.S. STRESS
TESTS 4 (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/effects-of-stress-testpaper.pdf. Thus, Kohn and Liang assert, “[O]ther things equal, stress test-related capital
requirements should increase in good times (and decrease in bad after losses have already
been realized).” Id. Kohn and Liang, however, conclude that, in practice, the stress tests’
countercyclical effects are modest, at best, and largely attributable to the stress tests’
assumptions regarding the pre-funding of bank dividends. Id. The Federal Reserve relaxed
these pre-funding assumptions in 2020, thereby reducing the extent to which the stress tests
mitigate procyclicality. See Regulations Q, Y, and YY: Regulatory Capital, Capital Plan, and
Stress Test Rules, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,576, 15,579 (Mar. 18, 2020) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.8
(2021)) (explaining the changes to pre-funding assumptions).
96 Policy Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing, 12 C.F.R. pt.
252 app. A § 4.2.2(g) (2021) (emphasis added).
97 In an empirical study, Federal Reserve economist Jose Berrospide and colleagues
determined that “while it may be possible to use more severe economic scenarios to counteract
the procyclical elements of the stress test, it is very difficult to push beyond that in order to
engineer countercyclical stress test outcomes.” JOSE BERROSPIDE ET AL., CYCLICALITY AND
THE SEVERITY OF THE U.S. SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST: 2014 TO 2018 (2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/cyclicality-and-the-severity-of-theus-supervisory-stress-test-2014-to-2018-20190607.htm. Thus, the researchers concluded,
“[U]sing the stress tests as a lever to generate countercyclical capital requirements . . . is
likely not possible without increasing the severity of the stress scenario to levels well beyond
those used over the 2014–2018 stress test cycles.” Id.
95
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B. CECL ACCOUNTING STANDARD

In addition to countercyclical capital requirements, policymakers
also attempted to implement countercyclical bank accounting
standards after the 2008 crisis. One example is loan loss
provisioning, a longstanding accounting tool that “require[s] banks
to set aside reserves for losses on individual loans.”98 Historically,
the United States’ loan loss accounting rules have had procyclical
effects during economic expansions and contractions.99
Policymakers tried to adopt reforms to mitigate this procyclicality
in the early 2010s,100 but the financial sector successfully pushed for
delays,101 leaving the U.S. financial system exposed when the
COVID-19 pandemic hit.
Historically, the United States’ loan loss accounting rules
amplified economic expansions and worsened economic
contractions. Under the traditional methodology—known as the
incurred-loss model—banks set aside reserves for a given loan only
when it was “probable” that the loan had already experienced a
loss.102 Thus, as the economy grew, the incurred-loss model required
banks to recognize few losses on their loans.103 This backwardlooking approach therefore fueled even more profligate lending
McCoy, supra note 4, at 1206.
See id. at 1206–07 (“Traditionally, provisioning rules have had a procyclical effect
because they have been computed based on losses already incurred, instead of on projected
future losses. This backward-looking approach produces low reserves when economic
conditions are favorable and high reserves during economic declines.” (footnote omitted)).
100 See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 4, at 1208 (recounting the 2011 International Accounting
Standards Boards and Financial Accounting Standards Boards’ “expected loss provisioning”
proposal to increase countercyclical provisioning); infra note 113 and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g., infra notes 113–117 and accompanying text.
102 See Larry D. Wall, Procyclicality: CECL Versus Incurred Loss Model, FED. RSRV. BANK
OF
ATLANTA
(Oct.
2019),
https://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/
notesfromthevault/10-procyclicality-cecl-versus-incurred-loss-model-2019-10-31
(“The
method in effect back in 2009 and in effect for all U.S. banks through the end of 2019 is called
the incurred loss model. Under this model, management estimates the losses on loans in
which a loss has already been incurred. That is, no loss is recorded on a loan until it is
‘probable’ that the bank has already incurred losses based on information available at that
time.”).
103 See CRISTIAN DERITIS & MARK ZANDI, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, GAUGING CECL
CYCLICALITY 3
(2018), https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/2018-12-03Gauging-CECL-Cyclicality.pdf (“During the [housing] boom [about a decade ago] when
unemployment was at its nadir and house prices at their peak, loss reserves were low and
falling.”).
98
99

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss2/2

26

Kress and Turk: Rethinking Countercyclical Financial Regulation

2022] RETHINKING COUNTERCYCLICAL REGULATION

521

during the housing boom in the mid-2000s.104 By contrast, the
incurred-loss model stalled the recovery from the Great Recession:
banks recognized widespread loan losses as the economy crashed in
late 2008 and early 2009, thereby eroding their capital and
triggering a credit crunch.105 Banks’ sudden recognition of losses, in
other words, inhibited their ability to lend and exacerbated the
crisis.
After the crisis, policymakers developed an alternative financial
accounting standard designed to reduce the procyclicality inherent
in the incurred-loss model. This new framework—known as the
current expected credit loss (CECL) methodology—directs banks to
recognize estimated lifetime losses on a loan at origination, rather
than waiting until losses become probable.106 In theory, the forwardlooking CECL standard is less procyclical than the backwardlooking incurred-loss model since banks must increase their loan
loss provisions during economic booms and thereby moderate their
lending.107 Furthermore, under CECL, banks are not required to
recognize sudden, widespread loan losses that could deepen an
economic downturn.108 Thus, as the Government Accountability
Office concluded in 2013, the CECL methodology would “help
address the cycle of losses and failures that emerged in the recent

104 See id. (describing the housing boom of the mid-2000s as an example of a “period[] when
loan defaults are low, lending standards are loose, and credit is amply available”).
105 Mark Zandi & Cris DeRitis, CECL Will Strengthen, Not Hinder, Financial System, AM.
BANKER (Nov. 30, 2018, 9:25 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cecl-willstrengthen-not-hinder-financial-system.
106 See Michael J. Walker, Benefits and Challenges of the “CECL” Approach 1 (Fed. Rsrv.
Bank of Bos., Working Paper SRA Note No. 1, 2019), https://www.bostonfed.org//media/Documents/Workingpapers/PDF/2019/sra-note-1901.pdf (“The CECL approach
requires financial institutions to record allowances for credit losses for loans, leases, and
certain other financial assets upon issuance or acquisition (i.e. on ‘day one’) . . . .”).
107 See Zandi & DeRitis, supra note 105 (“The economic logic of moving from incurred loss
accounting to CECL is that CECL is less procyclical. That is, in a recession when
unemployment is rising quickly and borrowers fall short on their loan payments, banks must
start adding more to their loss reserves, hurting profitability and capital. Banks have no
choice but to tighten their underwriting standards, curtailing the availability of credit and
adding to the economy’s woes.”).
108 See id. (discussing how early loan loss provisioning under CECL prevents sudden
recognition of losses and associated deleveraging).
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crisis as banks were forced to increase loan loss allowances and
raise capital when they were least able to do so.”109
While some observers contested whether CECL would, in fact, be
less procyclical than the incurred-loss model, the weight of the
empirical evidence supports the theoretical basis for the CECL
methodology. Banking trade groups asserted that CECL would
actually increase procyclicality during economic downturns because
a bank might refuse to lend if it were required to provision for losses
immediately.110 Analyses by policymakers and academics, however,
generally refuted these claims and confirmed that the CECL
methodology was less prone to procyclicality.111 Thus, the CECL
model appears to be a substantial improvement over the incurredloss model.112
Despite
CECL’s
promise,
policymakers
delayed
its
implementation in response to the financial sector’s objections. The
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) initially proposed
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-704T, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
OF
RECENT
COMMUNITY
BANK
FAILURES
(2013),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655193.pdf.
110 See, e.g., Francisco Covas & William Nelson, Current Expected Credit Loss: Lessons from
2007–2009, at 24–28 (Bank Pol’y Inst., Staff Working Paper No. 2018-1, 2018),
http://bpi.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/CECL-Lessons-2007-2009-WP-July-12-2018.pdf
(contending that “CECL would have been very procyclical had it been in place during the
2007–2009 financial crisis”); AM. BANKERS ASS’N, ABA SNAPSHOT OF BANKS’ CECL
ESTIMATES – MAY 2019, at 1–3 (2019), https://www.aba.com/-/media/documents/data/ceclloss-rate-expectations-may-2019.pdf (noting that “[a]n analysis of credit loss estimates
compiled by [various banks] appears to support the banking industry’s concern that
significantly increased capital and earnings volatility will result from CECL,” which “could
potentially undermine bank lending”).
111 See, e.g., Sarah Chae, Robert F. Sarama, Cindy M. Vojtech & James Wang, The Impact
of the Current Expected Credit Loss Standard (CECL) on the Timing and Comparability of
Reserves 2, 23 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, No.
2018-020,
2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2018020pap.pdf
(concluding that “CECL should be less pro-cyclical” than the incurred-loss standard); Bert
Loudis & Ben Ranish, CECL and the Credit Cycle 15–23 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv.
Sys,
Fin.
&
Econ.
Discussion
Series,
No.
2019-061,
2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019061pap.pdf (explaining that “CECL
appears slightly less procyclical than [the incurred-loss method]”); Benjamin H. Cohen &
Gerald A. Edwards Jr., The New Era of Expected Credit Loss Provisioning, BIS Q. REV., Mar.
2017, at 39, 49–53 (demonstrating how CECL “should reduce the procyclicality of the
financial system”); DERITIS & ZANDI, supra note 103, at 9–10 (finding that CECL “will be
meaningfully less procyclical than the current incurred loss standard”).
112 See supra note 111 and accompanying text; see also DERITIS & ZANDI, supra note 103,
at 3–4 (discussing limitations in critics’ analyses).
109

AND
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the CECL framework in 2012.113 In response, the FASB received
more than 3,300 comments—many from bankers who feared the
CECL methodology would increase compliance costs and weaken
their profitability.114 After three rounds of public consultation, the
FASB finally adopted the CECL framework in 2016, with an
effective date of December 15, 2019.115 Under pressure from the
financial sector, however, the FASB later delayed CECL’s effective
date until January 2023 for smaller banks.116 Then, at the onset of
the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress intervened and delayed the
CECL effective date for all banks—regardless of size—until the
earlier of January 1, 2021, or the expiration of the national
emergency.117
Due to these delays, U.S. banks were still using the backwardlooking incurred-loss methodology when the COVID-19 pandemic
113 See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FIN. ACCT. FOUND., PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
UPDATE: FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS—CREDIT LOSSES (SUBTOPIC 825-15) 1–2 (2012),
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1176160587228 (proposing
CECL).
114 See John Reosti, Banks Buckle Down for Hard Transition to New Loan-Loss Rule, AM.
BANKER (June 17, 2016, 2:42 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/banks-buckledown-for-hard-transition-to-new-loan-loss-rule (“[T]he FASB . . . worked through three
separate requests for comment, 3,360 comment letters and more than 220 meetings with
bankers, regulators, auditors and accountants. . . . One of the big concerns . . . was whether
lenders would be required to use costly complex modeling to develop the loan-loss forecasts
that the rule requires.”).
115 See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE NO. 2016-13:
FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS—CREDIT
LOSSES
(TOPIC
326)
5,
251–58
(2016),
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1176168232528
(explaining the FASB’s rationales for adopting the CECL framework and setting the effective
date).
116 See John Reosti, Emboldened by CECL Delay, Industry Seeks Repeal, AM. BANKER (July
17, 2019, 4:16 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/emboldened-by-cecl-delayindustry-seeks-repeal (discussing the FASB’s decision to delay CECL’s effective date for
smaller banks). Under pressure from the financial sector, the banking agencies also allowed
a three-year phase-in period for the regulatory capital effects of the CECL methodology. See
Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. & Off. of
the Comptroller of the Currency, Agencies Allow Three-Year Regulatory Capital Phase-In for
New Current Expected Credit Losses (CECL) Accounting Standard (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20181221a.htm (“[F]ederal
bank regulatory agencies approved a final rule . . . providing an option to phase in over a
period of three years the day-one regulatory capital effects of updated accounting standard
known as the ‘Current Expected Credit Losses’ (CECL) methodology.”).
117 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
§ 4014(b), 134 Stat. 281, 481 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9052(b)).
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hit in early 2020. If policymakers had implemented the forwardlooking CECL methodology in a timely manner, U.S. banks would
have prospectively set aside loss provisions for the loans they made
during the 2010s and would not have suffered a massive spike in
loan losses as a result of COVID-19. Instead, under the incurredloss framework, banks were forced to recognize unprecedented loan
losses when the pandemic hit.118 These sudden losses triggered
doubts about the financial system’s ability to continue serving as a
source of credit to the real economy absent extraordinary
government support.119 The delay in CECL implementation, in sum,
intensified the procyclicality of yet another economic cycle.
C. RISK RETENTION RULE

As an additional countercyclical regulatory tool, policymakers
adopted a risk retention rule, which requires banks to retain a
portion of the structured financial products they issue. Before the
2008 financial crisis, many banks engaged in securitization by
packaging loans—oftentimes mortgages—into a pool and selling
interests in that pool to third parties.120 In practice, securitization
had a procyclical effect on the economy because it allowed banks to
continue lending—and offloading risks to others—even as
vulnerabilities emerged in the financial system.121 After the crisis,
118 See, e.g., Laura Noonan & Robert Armstrong, Three US Banks Set Aside Record $28bn
for Loan Losses, FIN. TIMES (July 14, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/f1bbaf65-7cb7-4855ba7f-d9bda5f4b053 (“Three of America’s biggest banks have set aside a combined $28bn for
current and future loan losses, pushing Wells Fargo to a quarterly loss and hitting profits at
JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup as lenders count the cost of the coronavirus crisis.”).
119 See Jeanna Smialek, Fed Warns of Financial Risks as Coronavirus Downturn Persists,
N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/business/economy/fedfinancial-stability-coronavirus.html (describing fears about economic fallout and the Federal
Reserve’s intervention in the spring of 2020 with “a series of emergency lending facilities”
meant to ease the economic crisis).
120 See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1316
(2009) (describing securitization); Matthew C. Turk, Securitization Reform After the Crisis:
Regulation by Rulemaking or Regulation by Settlement?, 37 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 861, 866–
74 (2018) (explaining the mechanics and history of securitization); Dov Solomon, The Rise of
a Giant: Securitization and the Global Financial Crisis, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 859, 871–79 (2012)
(analyzing how “a securitization transaction enables the originator to externalize its
bankruptcy risk onto its creditors”).
121 See TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, MACROECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF RISK RETENTION REQUIREMENTS 30 (2011) (“The academic literature indicates
that there may be a connection between asset-backed securitization and an exacerbation of
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policymakers established a risk retention requirement to help
mitigate securitization’s procyclical effects.122 The financial sector,
however, challenged this rule and ultimately won a court order
exempting some of the riskiest structured financial products from
the risk retention requirement.123
Securitization was a key catalyst of the 2008 financial crisis.
Securitization allows a financial institution to transfer assets to a
special-purpose vehicle (SPV), which issues securities to
investors.124 The security holders then receive “a stream of
payments based on the performance of the underlying asset[s].”125
The securitization market boomed in the mid-2000s, with more than
$1 trillion in private-label mortgage-backed securities issued in
2006 alone.126 In retrospect, however, securitization skewed
financial institutions’ incentives and encouraged risky lending.
Because issuers did not retain credit exposure to the assets they
securitized, banks had little reason to care about a borrower’s
creditworthiness.127 Further, banks did not internalize the risks of
their loans, as they were not required to maintain capital against
assets they securitized.128
pro-cyclical lending.”); Erik F. Gerding, Bank Regulation and Securitization: How the Law
Improved Transmission Lines Between Real Estate and Banking Crises, 50 GA. L. REV. 89,
117–23 (2015) (discussing cyclicality risks in securitization).
122 See GEITHNER, supra note 121, at 2 (noting that the Dodd-Frank Act imposed a 5% credit
risk retention requirement).
123 See Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. SEC, 882 F.3d 220, 221–22 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(holding that the Credit Risk Retention Rule issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act did not
apply to collateralized loan obligation manager activities).
124 See Turk, supra note 120, at 866–69 (describing how securitization functions and the
process through which a sponsor creates an SPV).
125 Id. at 866.
126 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 49, at 102 (“In just two years, private-label
mortgage-backed securities had grown more than 30%, reaching $1.15 trillion in 2006 . . . .”).
127 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systematic Regulation of Systemic Risk, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 1,
10 (explaining that “[s]ecuritization depends in part on an originate-to-distribute . . . model,”
which “discourages lender monitoring and is believed to encourage lenders to make riskier
loans”); see also Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1881, 1912 (2011) (concluding that banks with high
involvement in the originate-to-distribute model of securitization issued inferior quality
mortgages).
128 See McCoy, supra note 4, at 1201 (explaining that under Basel I “banks did not have to
hold full capital against assets that they shifted off their balance sheets”). Even if banks
retained portions of their structured financial products, securitizations were often subject to
lower capital charges than they would have been if the bank held the underlying assets
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Securitization had a strongly procyclical effect on the U.S.
financial system. As the housing bubble inflated, securitization
increased the supply of mortgage credit, thereby boosting home
prices.129 At the peak of the housing market, banks doing onbalance-sheet lending might have pulled back from residential
mortgages, but because they were able to offload their mortgage
exposures into securitizations, they continued lending to borrowers
with dubious repayment prospects.130 Thus, the Financial Stability
Oversight Council concluded “that securitization may have
contributed to an expansion of credit in the run-up to the financial
crisis, which in turn facilitated increases in housing prices and
worsened the ensuing contraction in credit when the housing bubble
burst.”131
In the aftermath of the crisis, policymakers adopted a new risk
retention requirement to address perceived problems in the
securitization market. Implementing a provision in Dodd-Frank,
the federal financial regulatory agencies established a rule
requiring a securitization sponsor to retain 5% of the credit risk of
any securitization it issues.132 This new requirement ensures
securitization sponsors have “skin in the game.”133 At least in
theory, because a sponsor must retain some credit risk in the
securitization, the sponsor’s incentives will be better aligned with
investors in the securitization, and the sponsor will be less likely to
issue securitizations of questionable value.134
directly. William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Tale of Two Markets: Regulation and
Innovation in Post-Crisis Mortgage and Structured Finance Markets, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 47,
72.
129 See, e.g., Alejandro Justiniano, Giorgio E. Primiceri & Andrea Tambalotti, Credit Supply
and the Housing Boom 5 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., Staff Rep. No. 709, 2015),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr709.pdf
(explaining how mortgage-backed securities expanded the supply of credit).
130 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE JOINT
FORUM:
REPORT
ON
ASSET
SECURITIZATION
INCENTIVES
10
(2011),
https://www.bis.org/publ/joint26.pdf (“Risk transfer was another important motivator for
securitisation and was cited . . . as an important reason for engaging in securitisation.”).
131 GEITHNER, supra note 121, at 30.
132 Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,602, 77,603 (Dec. 24, 2014) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
pts. 43, 244, 373, 1234, 17 C.F.R. pt. 246, 24 C.F.R. pt. 267 (2021)).
133 Bratton & Levitin, supra note 128, at 66–67.
134 See id. (“Requiring securitizers to retain some of the risk on the assets that they are
securitizing—making them eat their own cooking—should ensure better quality assets in
securitizations, which will, in turn, cut off the financing for shoddily underwritten loans.”).
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The risk retention requirement was an explicitly countercyclical
reform. Policymakers reasoned that the risk retention rule would
reduce procyclicality in credit markets by better “aligning
incentives and improving underwriting standards.”135 In addition,
by forcing sponsors to tie up financial resources that could otherwise
be used to make additional loans, the risk retention requirement
would further mitigate procyclicality.136 Thus, the financial
regulatory agencies concluded that “[r]isk retention requirements
may help mitigate pro-cyclicality in credit formation and real estate
values, contributing to the stability of the financial system, the real
estate sector, and the economy.”137
Despite the risk retention rule’s promise, it contained a critical
omission: the rule did not apply to collateralized loan obligations
(CLOs), one of the riskiest and most prevalent structured financial
products. Generally speaking, a CLO is a securitization in which the
underlying asset pool is comprised of loans to corporations—
oftentimes heavily indebted corporations—purchased by the CLO
sponsor on behalf of the SPV.138 Initially, many market participants
thought that the risk retention requirement would be “a death
knell” for CLOs.139 The asset management industry, however,
challenged the application of the risk retention rule to CLOs. In
2018, the D.C. Circuit held that the risk retention rule does not
apply to CLOs because CLO SPVs purchase loans directly from the
open market, rather than receiving loans transferred by the
sponsor, as in a traditional securitization.140
GEITHNER, supra note 121, at 30.
See id. at 27 (“[R]isk retention could diminish the amount of credit available by tying
up cash that would otherwise be used to make additional loans—an effect that could further
mitigate some of the pro-cyclicality in credit supply that has been attributed to
securitization.”).
137 Id.
138 See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 128, at 97–100 (explaining that CLOs are comprised
of “the debt collateralized . . . [by] loans to corporations, often but not necessarily made by
banks”). CLOs come in two different varieties. In a balance-sheet CLO, a loan originator
transfers a corporate loan portfolio to an SPV, which issues securities. Id. at 98. By contrast,
in an arbitrage CLO, a sponsor purchases corporate loans issued by third parties to create
the underlying pool of assets. Id. at 98–99. Arbitrage CLOs are more common than balancesheet CLOs. Id.
139 Id. at 102.
140 See Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. SEC, 882 F.3d 220, 223–24, 229 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (“The language [of the Dodd-Frank Act Section 941] does not seem to apply to a person
or firm that causes an SPV, whose value belongs to the investors, to make an open-market
135
136
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The exclusion of CLOs from the risk retention rule exposed the
corporate credit market to procyclical risks similar to those that
plagued the mortgage market in the lead-up to and during the 2008
crisis. After the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, the CLO market ballooned to
more than $750 billion, as financial institutions continued churning
out loans to highly-leveraged corporations and transferring them to
CLOs.141 Meanwhile, underwriting criteria for corporate loans
deteriorated, just as they declined for mortgage loans in the mid2000s.142 Thus, when the COVID-19 pandemic hit and shut down
many businesses, observers predicted that losses on CLOs could
destabilize the broader financial system.143 These vulnerabilities
necessitated emergency programs—such as the Paycheck
Protection Program and the Main Street Lending Program144—to
assist companies whose debt comprised the CLO market.145 When
those efforts proved inadequate, the Federal Reserve began
purchasing certain CLOs directly to prevent the CLO market from

purchase from wholly independent third parties.”). Professors Bill Bratton and Adam Levitin
have noted that, even before the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, the asset management industry had
engineered a workaround and began structuring CLOs to avoid application of the risk
retention rules. See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 128, at 102 (“But the hurdle was
surmounted by the time the risk retention rules became effective.”).
141 See Saikat Chatterjee, Booming Securitized Loan Market Has Echoes of Financial
Crisis, BIS Warns, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2019, 12:19 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usbis-survey/booming-securitized-loan-market-has-echoes-of-financial-crisis-bis-warnsidUSKBN1W70MQ (“The number of [CLOs] . . . has ballooned in recent years as investors
hunt for higher returns by buying into loans to lower-rated and riskier companies.”).
142 See Lisa Lee, Jesse Hamilton, Sally Bakewell & Craig Torres, Fed Fires Warning Shot
at Wall Street’s Riskier Loan Deals, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2018, 12:47 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-25/fed-fires-warning-shot-at-wall-streets-riskier-loan-deals (describing loose regulations and enforcement practices that led banks to
“pil[e] risky loans onto highly indebted companies”).
143 See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Looming Bank Collapse, ATLANTIC, July–August 2020,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/07/coronavirus-banks-collapse/612247/
(predicting the “worst-case scenario” for the U.S. economy early in the COVID-19 pandemic
and focusing on CLOs as “the most troubling assets held by the banks”).
144 See Eric Milstein & David Wessel, What Did the Fed Do in Response to the COVID-19
Crisis?, BROOKINGS (Dec. 17, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/fed-response-tocovid19/ (chronicling the Federal Reserve’s “broad array of actions” meant to limit economic
fallout from COVID-19).
145 See Joe Rennison & Robert Smith, CLOs: Ground Zero for the Next Stage of the Financial
Crisis?, FIN. TIMES (May 13, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/f10eaaac-0f4e-46bc-8f780754028da46a (noting that the Federal Reserve’s support for lower-rated companies boosted
the CLO market).
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collapsing.146 Thus, although the risk retention rule was designed to
mitigate procyclicality in structured credit products, it was not
broad enough to capture CLOs, which proved to be highly
procyclical in the pandemic.
D. EARLY REMEDIATION REQUIREMENTS

Finally, in the wake of the 2008 crisis, policymakers tried to
implement early remediation requirements to prevent procyclical
bank failures. Historically, regulators often waited as long as
possible to close a distressed bank in the hope that the bank might
recover.147 This practice proved procyclical when regulators
shuttered many banks simultaneously in the depths of the 1980s
Savings and Loan (S&L) Crisis and the 2008 financial crisis,
fostering even wider panic.148 To prevent widespread, simultaneous
bank failures in the future, the Dodd-Frank Act directed the Federal
Reserve to establish early remediation standards that would force
authorities to intervene quickly, rather than allowing them to wait
until a bank is on the verge of collapse.149 To date, however, the
Federal Reserve has not finalized the early remediation
requirements, threatening another wave of procyclical bank
failures.
Excessive regulatory forbearance—for instance, waiting too long
to close a nonviable bank—can worsen economic downturns. That is
exactly what happened during the S&L Crisis, when regulators
delayed closing insolvent banks and thrifts, thereby inflicting large
losses on the United States’ deposit insurance systems when the
See Matt Wirz, Fed TALF Revision Could Help Clear CLO Logjam, WALL ST. J. (May
13, 2020, 4:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-talf-revision-could-help-clear-clologjam-11589383995 (describing the Federal Reserve’s “relief program for asset-backed debt”
that sought to “unclog a logjam in Wall Street’s pipeline of” CLOs).
147 See Jonathan M. Edwards, FDICIA v. Dodd-Frank: Unlearned Lessons About
Regulatory Forbearance, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 279, 281–82 (2011) (explaining how bank
regulators regularly postponed closures with both “case-by-case forbearance” and “wholesale
forbearance” measures).
148 See David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 117 (2010) (“The government
has always followed a boom and bust, rather procyclical approach to bank failures, despite
the best efforts of Congress to encourage the contrary.”).
149 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 166, 124 Stat. 1376, 1432 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5366) (directing the
“establish[ment] [of] requirements to provide for the early remediation of financial distress”
of a bank holding company).
146
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firms eventually collapsed.150 The FDIC’s practice of forbearance
was procyclical because it concentrated disruptions to the financial
system during the nadir of the crisis, rather than spreading out
insolvencies over several years.151 Thus, one of the lasting lessons of
the S&L Crisis was that the longer authorities wait to close a
distressed bank, the worse the losses are likely to be.
In response to the S&L Crisis, Congress adopted a
countercyclical policy intended to limit regulatory forbearance. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
established a system of “prompt corrective action” (PCA).152 The law
directed the regulatory agencies to close a distressed depository
institution within ninety days after its leverage ratio falls below
2%.153 As Professor David Zaring explained, PCA “was designed to
cajole regulators into closing banks quickly and more
countercyclically.”154 PCA therefore sought to avoid a situation
where the FDIC would have to close hundreds of insolvent banks
simultaneously and rapidly deplete its Deposit Insurance Fund.
Despite its promise, the PCA framework did not perform well
during the 2008 financial crisis. The PCA approach linked
regulatory intervention to a bank’s capital levels—specifically, its
leverage ratio.155 A bank’s capital ratios, however, are “a lagging
indicator” of its financial condition.156 Because several quarters may
elapse before a bank’s weaknesses are reflected in its capital ratios,
the PCA framework was late in triggering regulatory intervention
as the financial system deteriorated in 2008.157 As a result, the
FDIC was slow to close failing depository institutions, resulting in
150 See Edwards, supra note 147, at 281–82 (describing forbearance policies used in the
1980s that delayed closing banks, exacerbating losses by an estimated tens of billions of
dollars).
151 See Zaring, supra note 148, at 109, 112 (concluding that the FDIC “acts procyclically”).
152 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102242, § 131(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2253 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o) (“Each appropriate Federal
banking agency and the Corporation . . . shall carry out the purpose of this section by taking
prompt corrective action to resolve the problems of insured depository institutions.”).
153 Id. § 131(b)(3)(B), 105 Stat. at 2255.
154 Zaring, supra note 148, at 109.
155 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
156 See Edwards, supra note 147, at 288 (discussing criticisms of the PCA framework,
including that it “links intervention to a bank’s capital, which is a lagging indicator of
problems”).
157 See id. at 288–89 (“PCA’s capital categories are late in alerting regulators that
enforcement actions are needed.”).
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widespread, simultaneous bank failures reminiscent of the S&L
Crisis.158 The FDIC, for example, shuttered 140 banks in 2009, only
19% of which had been subject to PCA orders.159 The capital-focused
PCA framework, in sum, failed to prevent significant losses to the
Deposit Insurance Fund.160
To fix PCA’s shortcomings, Congress established new early
remediation requirements in Dodd-Frank. Section 166 of DoddFrank directed the Federal Reserve to apply the same principle as
PCA—early intervention to prevent a more dramatic collapse later
on—but to rely on a broader range of forward-looking financial
metrics in addition to a bank’s capital levels.161 The Federal Reserve
proposed a rule to implement Dodd-Frank’s early remediation
requirements for large bank holding companies (BHCs) in 2012.162
The proposal identified several triggers for remediation—including
a BHC’s liquidity levels, risk-management weaknesses, stress test
results, and market indicators.163 If a BHC breached any of the
prescribed thresholds, the Federal Reserve would apply
increasingly-severe penalties such as restrictions on growth, capital
distributions, and executive compensation, as well as compulsory
capital raising or asset sales.164 By instituting these remedial
measures based on early warning signs of a BHC’s distress, the
Federal Reserve could help rehabilitate the firm, or at least
minimize losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund, if the company
ultimately failed.
The Federal Reserve, however, never finalized its early
remediation framework. In a 2014 final rule implementing key
158 See Zaring, supra note 148, at 117–20 (demonstrating that during the 2008 crisis, “the
FDIC did not use its PCA authority frequently” and that the government’s response to the
2008 financial crisis, like the S&L crisis, “tended to fail institutions when times [we]re bad”).
159 Id. at 119.
160 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-612, BANK REGULATION: MODIFIED
PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION FRAMEWORK WOULD IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS 15–23 (2011),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11612.pdf (documenting how the capital-based PCA regime
contributed to significant losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund).
161 See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 166, 124 Stat. 1376, 1432 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5366) (calling for regulations that
“define measures of the financial condition of the company, including regulatory capital,
liquidity measures, and other forward-looking indicators”).
162 Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594, 634–42 (Jan. 5, 2012) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252 (2021)).
163 Id. at 639–640.
164 Id. at 634–38.
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Dodd-Frank provisions, the Federal Reserve punted on the early
remediation requirements,165 stating that it “continues to review the
[public] comments” on the proposal.166 Since then, however, the
early remediation proposal “appears to have vanished.”167 As the
American Banker put it, “The Fed has made little to no mention of
[the proposal], and it’s not clear when or even if the central bank
plans to finalize it.”168
Thus, as the COVID-19 pandemic hit in early 2020, one of DoddFrank’s primary countercyclical tools remained unfinished. Despite
the Dodd-Frank drafters’ intentions, the Federal Reserve still lacks
a framework for addressing early warning signs in the banking
sector. If the banking system experiences extreme stress as a result
of the pandemic, the ineffectual PCA framework will guide
regulators’ decisions to shut down failing banks. The U.S. financial
system therefore remains at risk of widespread, concurrent bank
failures, similar to the S&L Crisis and 2008 financial crisis.
In sum, despite the countercyclical framework established in
Dodd-Frank,
regulators
failed
to
implement
effective
countercyclical rules in the decade following the legislation’s
enactment. Policymakers’ failure to capitalize on this opportunity
proved problematic when the COVID-19 pandemic shocked the U.S.
financial system, as the next Part examines.

165 See Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banking
Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 17,240, 17,243 (Mar. 27, 2014) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252
(2021)) (stating that “the Board continues to develop . . . early remediation requirements for
bank holding companies and foreign banking organizations”).
166 Id.
167 John Heltman, Key Part of Dodd-Frank Remains Missing in Action, AM. BANKER (Aug.
31, 2017, 3:19 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/key-part-of-dodd-frank-remainsmissing-in-action.
168 Id. The Federal Reserve has arguably implemented some early remediation
requirements as part of other Dodd-Frank regulations. See id. (citing a banking industry
official’s claim that the Fed effectively “baked [Section 166’s early remediation requirements]
into almost all of its [Section] 165 rules”). For example, the Federal Reserve’s liquidity
coverage ratio rule requires a BHC to develop a remedial plan when its liquidity ratio falls
below a given threshold. 12 C.F.R. § 249.40(b) (2021). Nonetheless, central elements of the
early remediation proposal—including the risk-management and market indicator
provisions—have not been codified. See Heltman, supra note 167 (highlighting the required
remediation rules under Section 166 that remain unimplemented).
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IV. THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC:
RELEARNING THE LESSONS OF 2008
In early 2020, the U.S. financial system teetered on the brink of
collapse for the second time in a decade, this time due to the COVID19 pandemic. The Wall Street Journal proclaimed that “coronavirus
nearly broke financial markets” as the pandemic swept through the
United States that spring.169 Commentators questioned whether
banks and other financial institutions could survive a steep
recession.170 Policymakers responded by flooding financial markets
with unprecedented government support and granting banks
extraordinary regulatory relief to stave off collapse. This Part
contends that the distress triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic and
subsequent government interventions were byproducts of
policymakers’ failure to enact meaningful countercyclical policies in
the wake of the 2008 crisis. Section III.A analyzes the federal
government’s economic and regulatory interventions to stabilize the
financial system throughout 2020. Section III.B then demonstrates
that policymakers’ failure to implement countercyclical reforms
during the 2010s exacerbated the fragility of the financial sector
when it encountered the COVID-19 pandemic.
A. FINANCIAL SECTOR FRAGILITIES AND THE EMERGENCY
RESPONSE

As the COVID-19 pandemic ravaged the United States, the
federal government responded to vulnerabilities in financial
markets in two ways: by injecting trillions of dollars into the
economy and by granting banks extraordinary regulatory relief.
Collectively, these emergency interventions buoyed banks and other
financial institutions and helped prevent the types of catastrophic
insolvencies that occurred in 2008. This Section examines the
government’s responses to COVID-19 and discusses how these
extraordinary interventions helped keep banks afloat during the
pandemic.

Baer, supra note 12.
See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 143 (“[W]e could be on the precipice of another crash, one
different from 2008 less in kind than in degree. This one could be worse.”).
169
170
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1. Government Support for the Financial System. The most
visible way in which the federal government responded to the
COVID-19 recession was by providing direct fiscal and monetary
support to the economy. The federal government injected trillions of
dollars of liquidity into the financial system, granted emergency
assistance to bank borrowers, and created new government-backed
loan programs administered by banks.171 Taken together, these
interventions halted a debilitating run on nonbank financial
institutions, reduced the volume of loan defaults, and generated
lucrative new revenue streams for financial institutions.172 In doing
so, these extraordinary government support mechanisms helped
prevent a potentially catastrophic collapse of the financial system.
At the first sign of COVID-induced distress in March 2020, the
federal government flooded financial markets with liquidity
through fiscal and monetary channels. To begin, the Federal
Reserve shored up shadow banks by expanding its backstop of the
Treasury repurchase market with an additional $1.5 trillion in
funding.173 The Federal Reserve also revived its 2008-era emergency
liquidity programs, such as the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility (TALF) and Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), which
allowed banks and broker-dealers to borrow from the Federal
Reserve against marketable collateral.174 In the same week, the
171 For an overview of the U.S. government’s fiscal and monetary policy interventions in
response to COVID-19, see generally Lev Menand, Unappropriated Dollars: The Fed’s Ad Hoc
Lending Facilities and the Rules That Govern Them (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working
Paper
No.
518/2020,
2020),
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/menandfinal.pdf.
172 See id. at 12, 21 (describing the new ad hoc lending programs designed “to prevent a
wave of debt defaults that could fuel a deflationary spiral” and new credit facilities “designed
to actively expand credit to mitigate the impact of lost revenues”).
173 Statement Regarding Treasury Reserve Management Purchases and Repurchase
RSRV.
BANK
OF
N.Y.
(Mar.
12,
2020),
Operations,
FED.
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/opolicy/operating_policy_200312a. As Graham Steele
and Matt Stoller pointed out, the Federal Reserve’s backstopping of short-term wholesale
funding markets actually pre-dated the COVID-19 pandemic. See Graham Steele & Matt
Stoller, The Crisis in Financial Markets Began Before COVID-19, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 19,
2020),
https://prospect.org/economy/the-crisis-in-financial-markets-began-before-covid-19/
(describing the Federal Reserve’s interventions in the repurchase agreement market
beginning in 2019).
174 See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Announces
Extensive
New
Measures
to
Support
the
Economy
(Mar.
23,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200323b.htm
(announcing the establishment of TALF ); Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv.
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Federal Reserve also reduced the interest rate at which it lends to
banks through the discount window,175 and it committed to
purchasing $700 billion worth of government securities to further
increase liquidity.176 Congress then augmented the Federal
Reserve’s efforts by providing $454 billion of CARES Act funding to
establish additional facilities “for the purpose of providing liquidity
to the financial system.”177 The Federal Reserve established a
liquidity facility for assets owned by money market mutual funds
(MMMFs) with an equity backstop from the Treasury Department
to absorb losses.178
The government’s liquidity support benefitted banks in several
ways. For example, the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending
programs lubricated critical financial markets that had initially

Sys., Federal Reserve Board Announces Establishment of a Primary Dealer Credit Facility
(PDCF) to Support the Credit Needs of Households and Businesses (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200317b.htm
(announcing the establishment of PDCF); see also Jackson & Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 205
(referring to this lending facility as “TALF 2.0”). As Professors Jackson and Schwarcz note,
the term sheets released by the Federal Reserve in connection with the TALF and other
lending facilities were often updated versions of similar documents from the 2008 crisis. Id.
175 See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Actions to
Support the Flow of Credit to Households and Businesses (Mar. 15, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200315b.htm
(“The
Federal Reserve encourages depository institutions to turn to the discount window to help
meet demands for credit from households and businesses at this time. In support of this goal,
the Board today announced that it will lower the primary credit rate . . . .”).
176 See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Issues
FOMC
Statement
(Mar.
15,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200315a.htm
(“To
support the smooth functioning of markets for Treasury securities and agency mortgagebacked securities . . . the Committee will increase its holdings of Treasury securities by at
least $500 billion and its holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities by at least $200
billion.”).
177 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, §
4003(b), 134 Stat. 281, 470 (2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9042).
178 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board Broadens
Program of Support for the Flow of Credit to Households and Businesses by Establishing a
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF) (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200318a.htm.
Congress also reversed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008’s prohibition on
the Treasury Department’s ability to backstop MMMFs. See CARES Act § 4015, 134 Stat. at
481 (“Section 131 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (12 U.S.C. 5236) shall
not apply during the period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act and ending on
December 31, 2020.”).
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threatened to grind to a halt.179 The central bank’s backstop
prevented debilitating runs by short-term creditors from triggering
a full-scale collapse, as they did in 2008.180 Moreover, large banks
including JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley earned
record-high trading revenues as clients rapidly revamped their
portfolios in reaction to government stimulus measures and stock
market volatility.181
The federal government also bolstered the banking system by
providing liquidity assistance and direct grants to bank borrowers.
For example, the CARES Act established the Paycheck Protection
Program (PPP), which extended forgivable loans of up to $10 million
to eligible small businesses.182 Recipients of PPP loans were
permitted to use these funds to make interest payments on their
mortgages and “on any other debt obligations” they incurred before
the pandemic.183 Meanwhile, Congress authorized $1,200 checks
and an additional $600 per week of unemployment benefits to
eligible Americans, many of whom used this assistance to pay off
existing debts.184 Collectively, these stimulus measures reduced

179 See, e.g., Jane Ihrig, Gretchen C. Weinbach & Scott A. Wolla, COVID-19’s Effects on the
Economy and the Fed’s Response, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS: PAGE ONE ECON. (Sept.
2020), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/page1-econ/2020/08/10/covid-19s-effectson-the-economy-and-the-feds-response (explaining how the Federal Reserve’s lending
facilities helped “unfreeze” the financial markets).
180 For a discussion of short-term creditor runs during the 2008 crisis, see MORGAN RICKS,
THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION 93–101 (2016).
181 See Rey Mashayekhi, Big Banks’ Trading Revenues Soar 30% Amid Coronavirus(Apr.
20,
2020,
3:13
PM),
Related
Stock
Market
Volatility,
FORTUNE
https://fortune.com/2020/04/20/coronavirus-big-banks-trading-stock-market-volatility/
(“Trading revenues at the ‘big five’ U.S. banks—Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs,
JPMorgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley—swelled 30% in the first quarter of the year . . . .”).
182 See CARES Act §1102(a), 134 Stat. at 286 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)) (describing
what types of businesses qualify as a small business under the Act and the maximum amount
of loan relief they could obtain).
183 Id. §1102(a)(1)(F), 134 Stat. at 290 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(F)). Congress reupped the PPP in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, colloquially known as “CARES Act
2.0.” Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182, 1979–80 (2020).
For an overview of CARES Act 2.0, see DAVIS POLK, PANDEMIC RELIEF PACKAGE—PPP AND
FEDERAL
RESERVE
PROVISIONS
2–7
(2020),
https://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/2021-06/2020-1223_pandemic_relief_package_ppp_and_federal_reserve_provisions.pdf.
184 See Siobhan Hughes et al., What’s in the $2 Trillion Senate Coronavirus Bill, WALL ST.
J. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/whats-in-the-2-trillion-senate-coronavirusbill-11585185450 (discussing federal stimulus checks and unemployment benefits); see also
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borrower defaults on outstanding loans and mitigated the extent of
banks’ COVID-related write-downs.185 According to a Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis study, the government’s fiscal support
programs shielded banks from as much as $300 billion in loan losses
that otherwise would have depleted their capital cushions.186
Finally, the federal government propped up the financial system
by deputizing banks to administer COVID relief efforts. Most
notably, policymakers tasked banks with processing loan
applications and disbursing funds for the PPP.187 In exchange,
banks earned fees ranging from 1% to 5%, depending on the size of
a loan.188 In total, banks reaped an estimated $24 billion in fees from
administering the first round of PPP loans.189 Because PPP loans
were fully guaranteed by the Small Business Administration,
issuing banks faced no credit risk from potential borrower
defaults.190 Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve agreed to lend to
participating banks and accept PPP loans as collateral to ensure
Matthew Dalton & AnnaMaria Andriotis, Consumers, Flush With Stimulus Money, Shun
S T.
J.
(Aug.
2,
2020,
9:00
AM),
Credit-Card
Debt,
WALL
https://www.wsj.com/articles/consumers-flush-with-stimulus-money-shun-credit-card-debt11596373201 (noting the decline in credit card delinquencies after federal stimulus
payments).
185 See Philip van Doorn, Big U.S. Banks’ Day of Reckoning is Delayed, MARKETWATCH
(Oct. 24, 2020, 9:28 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/big-us-banks-day-ofreckoning-is-delayed-2020-10-22 (“Stimulus from the federal government and Federal
Reserve help[ed] banks put off big losses[.]”).
186 Ron J. Feldman & Jason Schmidt, Government Fiscal Support Protected Banks from
Huge Losses During the COVID-19 Crisis, FED. RSRV. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (May 26, 2021),
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2021/government-fiscal-support-protected-banksfrom-huge-losses-during-the-covid-19-crisis; see also Neel Kashkari, Banks Cannot Expect
Government to Bail Them Out of Every Crisis, FIN. TIMES (June 28, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/760f8a05-d5be-4066-8f3d-802d78c33bce (noting that the study’s
estimated $100 to $300 billion in losses is “probably on the low side because, without
aggressive government support, it is unlikely that the economy would be recovering nearly
as quickly” and possible that “banks might still be facing losses”).
187 See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed.
Reg. 20,811, 20,815 (Apr. 15, 2020) (listing entities eligible to administer PPP loans).
188 Id. at 20,816.
189 See David Benoit & Peter Rudegeair, Banks Could Get $24 Billion in Fees From PPP
Loans, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2020, 11:07 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-could-get24-billion-in-fees-from-ppp-loans-11594134444 (“In total, the more than 4,000 lending
institutions in the analysis are in line to split $14.3 billion to $24.6 billion in processing fees
for PPP loans . . . .”).
190 Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed.
Reg. at 20,812.
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that a bank’s participation in the PPP did not create liquidity
pressure.191 Thus, the government’s decision to funnel COVID relief
through the banking system generated substantial fee income for
banks with negligible commensurate risk.192
2. Relaxation of Regulatory Requirements. In addition to injecting
unprecedented sums of money into the economy, policymakers also
supported the banking system by relaxing or outright waiving
various regulatory requirements. In response to the COVID-19
pandemic, the federal banking agencies loosened capital
requirements for both large and small banks, weakened liquidity
rules, waived accounting standards, suspended affiliate transaction
limits,
and
relaxed
mortgage-underwriting
guidelines.
Policymakers generally justified these actions on the ground that
they would facilitate the flow of credit to households and
businesses.193 Taken together, however, this flurry of deregulatory
activity rolled back many key Dodd-Frank safeguards. Gradually
easing restrictions during times of stress is fully consistent with
See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Takes
Additional Actions to Provide Up To $2.3 Trillion in Loans to Support the Economy (Apr. 9,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200409a.htm
(announcing that the Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility would extend credit to
banks that originate PPP loans).
192 To be sure, the argument here is not that the government’s use of the financial system
as a lending intermediary was unjustified but simply that it was structured in a way that
provided a windfall to the banking sector. See Todd Baker & Kathryn Judge, How to Help
Small Businesses Survive COVID-19, at 2 (Columbia Univ. Sch. of L., Ctr. for L. & Econ.
Stud.,
Working
Paper
No.
620,
2020),
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/
faculty_scholarship/2639/ (“The government lacks the means to provide full support to all of
the people and businesses that will suffer; so . . . it must consider how best to leverage the
money it is investing to get the economy back on track . . . . Banks and other lenders . . . can
help.”).
193 See, e.g., Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. & Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Regulators Temporarily Change the
Supplementary Leverage Ratio to Increase Banking Organizations’ Ability to Support Credit
to Households and Businesses in Light of the Coronavirus Response (May 15, 2020)
[hereinafter
May
15
Joint
Press
Release],
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200515a.htm (stating that
changes to the supplementary leverage ratio would allow depository institutions to continue
providing credit to households and businesses); see also Regulatory Capital Rule: Temporary
Exclusion of U.S. Treasury Securities and Deposits at Federal Reserve Banks from the
Supplementary Leverage Ratio for Depository Institutions, 85 Fed. Reg. 32,980, 32,984 (June
1, 2020) (“If depository institutions become constrained by supplementary leverage ratio
requirements, this could adversely affect their ability to intermediate in financial markets
and hamper their ability to provide credit to households and businesses.”).
191
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countercyclical logic. In this case, however, relaxing limits during
the pandemic unduly intensified the financial sector’s fragility
because policymakers had failed to strengthen safeguards
countercyclically during the record-setting expansion of the 2010s.
In one of their first actions in response to the pandemic, the
federal banking agencies eased capital requirements for the United
States’ largest banks.194 After the 2008 crisis, the banking agencies
established a supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) requirement of
3%—calculated as capital divided by total assets—for banks with
more than $250 billion in assets.195 When the pandemic hit,
however, the agencies weakened this requirement by allowing
banks to exclude cash and Treasury securities from their SLR
denominator until the second quarter of 2021.196 In practice, this

See Regulatory Capital Rule: Temporary Exclusion of U.S. Treasury Securities and
Deposits at Federal Reserve Banks from the Supplementary Leverage Ratio for Depository
Institutions, 85 Fed. Reg. 32,980, 32,982 (June 1, 2020) (codified in scattered sections of 12
C.F.R.) (altering leverage requirements for banks “[i]n response to volatility and market
strains” in order “to support market functioning and the flow of credit to the economy”).
195 See 12 C.F.R. §217.10(a)(1)(v) (2021) (stating that the minimum capital requirements
for Category III Board-regulated institutions include a SLR of 3%); id. § 217.2 (defining a
Category III Board-regulated institution as one that has $250 billion in assets or more).
The SLR differed from the United States’ pre-crisis leverage ratio because it required
banks to recognize off-balance sheet exposures, such as derivatives, in the ratio’s
denominator. See Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III,
Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach
for Risk-weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, Advanced
Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 62,018,
62,031–33 (Oct. 11, 2013) (codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.) (“[T]he agencies believe
that total leverage exposure should include banking organizations’ off-balance sheet
exposures . . . .”).
196 See Regulatory Capital Rule: Temporary Exclusion of U.S. Treasury Securities and
Deposits at Federal Reserve Banks from the Supplementary Leverage Ratio for Depository
Institutions, 85 Fed. Reg. at 32,982–83 (“For purposes of reporting the [SLR] as of June 30,
2020, an electing depository institution may reflect the exclusion of Treasuries and deposits
at Federal Reserve Banks from total leverage exposure . . . . ”). As with many pandemicrelated regulatory rollbacks, the agencies couched this move as an effort to enhance banks’
ability to lend to households and businesses. See, e.g., May 15 Joint Press Release, supra note
193 (explaining that the changes to the SLR because of the Coronavirus will “provide
flexibility to certain depository institutions to expand their balance sheets in order to provide
credit to households and businesses”). As some commentators have noted, however, the
exclusion of cash and Treasury securities from banks’ SLR denominator may have the
opposite effect. See, e.g., GREGG GELZINIS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, BANK CAPITAL AND THE
CORONAVIRUS
CRISIS
10–13
(2020),
https://cf.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/Banking-Capital.pdf?_ga=2.63708396.2119495594.1642907645194
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carve-out permitted the United States’ largest bank holding
companies to reduce their capital levels by up to $76 billion.197
Policymakers also granted small banks relief from their capital
requirements. In 2018, Congress exempted any community bank
with less than $10 billion in assets from complex risk-based capital
requirements if the bank satisfied a “community bank leverage
ratio” (CBLR) between 8 and 10%.198 The federal banking agencies
initially fixed the CBLR at 9%.199 When the COVID-19 pandemic
hit, however, Congress temporarily lowered the CBLR to 8%
through the end of 2020.200 The federal banking agencies later
extended CBLR relief through 2021.201
In addition to capital requirements, the federal banking agencies
also weakened bank liquidity safeguards. In March 2020, the
Federal Reserve permanently eliminated the requirement that
depository institutions maintain a minimum quantity of reserves at
the central bank.202 This rule change freed 2,500 depository
institutions from keeping $150 billion in Federal Reserve accounts
to satisfy reserve requirements.203 While this reform ultimately had

1910003458.1642907645 (criticizing the SLR exclusion and proposing alternative measures
that may have been effective at achieving the same goals). Indeed, by reducing the capital
impact of holding cash and Treasury securities relative to loans, the SLR exclusion actually
incentivizes banks to hold more of these assets while engaging in relatively less lending. See
id. at 12 (explaining that the exemption of cash and Treasury securities “made those assets
more financially attractive for banks than before,” which made lending to those institutions
“more expensive in relation to these exempted assets”).
197 See Temporary Exclusion of U.S. Treasury Securities and Deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks from the Supplementary Leverage Ratio, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,578, 20,580 n.8 (Apr. 14,
2020) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (2021)) (“The interim final rule would reduce the amount
of tier 1 capital required to meet the [SLR] ratio requirements by around $76 billion at holding
companies.”).
198 Kress & Turk, supra note 55, at 688. For background on the CBLR, see id. at 686–91.
199 Regulatory Capital Rule: Capital Simplification for Qualifying Community Banking
Organizations, 84 Fed. Reg. 61,776, 61,780 (Nov. 13, 2019) (codified in scattered sections of
12 C.F.R.).
200 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
§ 4012(b), 134 Stat. 281, 479 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9050).
201 See Regulatory Capital Rule: Transition for the Community Bank Leverage Ratio
Framework, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,930, 22,932 (Apr. 23, 2020) (codified in scattered sections of 12
C.F.R.) (setting the CBLR at 8.5% for the 2021 calendar year).
202 See Regulation D: Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,525,
16,525 (Mar. 24, 2020) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 204 (2021)) (“[T]he Board has determined to
reduce the reserve requirement ratios to zero percent . . . .”).
203 Id.
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minimal practical effect because the financial system remained
flush with liquidity due to the government interventions (as
discussed in Section IV.A.1), this outcome was not certain at the
outset.
More consequentially, policymakers overhauled accounting
standards to shield banks from recognizing losses on their loans. In
March 2020, the federal banking agencies encouraged financial
institutions to modify loans for borrowers affected by COVID-19 by
announcing that any such modified loan would not be classified as
a troubled debt restructuring and therefore would not be subject to
adverse regulatory or supervisory treatment.204 Later that month,
the CARES Act delayed the scheduled implementation of the CECL
accounting methodology through the end of 2020, which would have
required a bank to recognize anticipated losses when it makes a loan
rather than when those losses become reasonably certain.205 The
banking agencies later delayed CECL’s implementation for an
additional two years.206
In addition, regulators relaxed longstanding limits on affiliate
transactions, thereby allowing financial conglomerates to move
billions of dollars of risky exposures into their federally-insured
banks.207 After banks incurred losses on preferential loans to their
affiliates during the Great Depression, Congress enacted Section
23A of the Federal Reserve Act to protect federally-insured
depository institutions by restricting transactions with their
204 See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. et al., Interagency Statement
on Loan Modifications and Reporting for Financial Institutions Working with Customers
Affected by the Coronavirus 2–3 (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.fdic.gov/news/pressreleases/2020/pr20038a.pdf (announcing new treatment of modified loans).
205 CARES Act § 4014, 134 Stat. at 481 (providing temporary delay of CECL standards);
see also supra Section III.B (discussing CECL methodology).
206 See Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.
& Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Agencies Announce Two Actions to Support
Lending
to
Households
and
Businesses
(Mar.
27,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200327a.htm
(“Banking
organizations that are required under U.S. accounting standards to adopt CECL this year
can mitigate the estimated cumulative regulatory capital effects for up to two years.”). For
additional discussion of the CECL accounting methodology and its potential countercyclical
benefits, see infra Section IV.B.
207 See, e.g., Dave Michaels, Goldman Steps in to Shore up Two Money Funds, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 24, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/goldman-steps-in-to-shore-up-twomoney-funds-11585042200?mod=hp_lead_pos4 (reporting financial conglomerates utilizing
relaxed limits in the spring of 2020).
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affiliates.208 When financial conglomerates’ broker-dealer and
MMMF affiliates began experiencing distress in March 2020,
however, the Federal Reserve issued temporary exemptions to
Section 23A, permitting banks to purchase assets from their
affiliates.209 These exemptions mirrored similar regulatory relief
the Federal Reserve granted during the 2008 crisis.210 This time,
financial companies including Goldman Sachs, Bank of New York
Mellon, and PNC Financial Services took advantage of Section 23A
exemptions to move billions of dollars of risk from their brokerdealer and MMMF affiliates into their federally-insured banks.211
Lastly, policymakers relaxed banks’ mortgage origination
requirements. For example, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—the
government-sponsored
mortgage
giants—eased
guidelines
concerning lending standards, such as income verification for home
208 12 U.S.C. § 371c; Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The
Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1692–95
(2011) (“Congress enacted section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act in 1933, in response to one
of the perceived causes of the banking crisis of the early 1930s: preferential loans banks made
to their affiliates.”).
209 See Template Letter from Ann E. Misback, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.
(Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/legalinterpretations/fedreser
seactint20200318.pdf (issuing temporary exemptions from Section 23A for the “purchase [of]
certain assets from affiliated broker-dealers”); Template Letter from Ann E. Misback, Sec’y,
Bd.
of
Governors
of
the
Fed.
Rsrv.
Sys.
(Mar.
17,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/legalinterpretations/fedreserseactint2020031
7.pdf (issuing temporary exemptions from Section 23A for the “purchase [of] certain assets
from affiliated money market mutual funds”). In addition, the Securities and Exchange
Commission temporarily waived its Rule 17a-9, which would have restricted a bank’s
purchase of assets from its MMMF affiliate. See Letter from Thoreau Bartmann, Senior
Special Couns., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Susan Olson, Inv. Co. Inst. (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/investment/investment-company-institute-031920-17a (declining to
recommend an enforcement action to the SEC under Rule 17a-9 on a temporary basis due to
the COVID-19 outbreak).
210 As Professor Saule Omarova wrote, during the 2008 crisis, the Federal Reserve “granted
numerous financial institutions exemptions from . . . section 23A in order to prevent the
failure of their nonbank businesses and to avert broader market dislocations, even though
such emergency measures contradicted the fundamental policy goals behind section 23A.”
Omarova, supra note 208, at 1729.
211 See, e.g., Letter from Ann E. Misback, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., to
Joseph M. Otting, Comptroller, Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/legalinterpretations/fedreserseactint2020032
5.pdf (granting PNC Bank’s request for Section 23A exemption); Michaels, supra note 207
(reporting various banks using new exemptions “to shore up . . . [MMFs] after the Federal
Reserve created a backstop to stem a wave of investor redemptions from the products”).
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mortgages.212 Similarly, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
delayed reporting requirements for home lenders that would
otherwise need to disclose data on borrowers’ ability to repay their
mortgages under Dodd-Frank.213
In sum, policymakers responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by
granting banks relief from key financial safeguards, including many
that had been adopted just a decade earlier in Dodd-Frank. Of
course, relaxing regulatory requirements in reaction to an economic
crisis is perfectly consistent with countercyclical logic.214 In this
case, however, aggressive regulatory relief was unduly costly
because policymakers failed to use countercyclical tools during the
economic expansion that preceded the pandemic, as the next Section
explains.
B. LESSONS FOR COUNTERCYCLICAL REGULATION

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed two valuable lessons for
countercyclical financial regulation. First, the pandemic and
subsequent recession exposed weaknesses in the post-2008
regulatory framework. Although Dodd-Frank promised a
countercyclical regulatory approach, the federal banking agencies
did not follow through, leaving the financial system unprotected
when the pandemic emerged. Second, the agencies’ failure to
implement meaningful countercyclical rules necessitated costly
federal subsidies to prop up the banking sector throughout the
pandemic. These subsidies will not only burden future U.S.
taxpayers but also exacerbate the problem of moral hazard and
thereby threaten the stability of the financial system going forward.

212 See Holly Spencer Bunting, Christopher G. Smith & Kelly F. Truesdale, Origination in
the Era of COVID-19: The GSEs, FHA, and VA Issue Guidance for Appraisals and Income
Verification, MAYER BROWN (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectivesevents/publications/2020/04/origination-in-the-era-of-covid-19--the-gses-fha-and-va-issueguidance-for-appraisals-and-income-verification (describing how the government-sponsored
enterprises temporarily relaxed standards early in the COVID-19 pandemic).
213 See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Provides Flexibility during
COVID-19
Pandemic
(Mar.
26,
2020),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-provides-flexibility-during-covid-19-pandemic/ (“The Bureau is postponing
some data collections from industry on Bureau-related rules to allow companies to focus on
responding to consumers in need and making changes to its supervisory activities to account
for operational challenges at regulated entities.”).
214 See supra notes 7 & 60 and accompanying text.
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This Section examines the shortcomings of Dodd-Frank’s
countercyclical framework and the long-term costs that the failed
countercyclical approach will impose on the U.S. financial system.
1.
Countercyclical
Regulation’s
Unfulfilled
Promise.
Policymakers’ failure to enact effective countercyclical financial
regulation in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis was a critical missed
opportunity to cushion the COVID-19 pandemic’s effects on the U.S.
financial system. Despite an emerging consensus that Dodd-Frank
prevented widespread bank failures during the pandemic,215 the
post-2008 regulatory framework in fact fell short, as evidenced by
the numerous government interventions that buoyed the financial
system. A strong countercyclical framework, by contrast, could have
obviated the need for many of the emergency policy interventions
that kept the U.S. financial system functioning during the
pandemic.
As the COVID-19 virus spread throughout the United States, so
too did a narrative that Dodd-Frank and other post-crisis
regulations protected the financial system from collapse. Federal
Reserve Vice Chair for Supervision Randal Quarles, for example,
declared that although “[t]he COVID event precipitated the most
abrupt decline in U.S. and global economic activity in recorded
history[,] . . . the banking system remained resilient.”216 Quarles
also proclaimed that the banking system, “[s]trengthened by a
decade of improvements in capital, liquidity, and risk management,
. . . became an important shelter from financial distress.”217
Economists Viral Acharya and Sascha Steffen likewise concluded
that “it is a testament to the success of the post-[2008] reforms . . .
that the present levels of capitalisation . . . appear adequate to deal

215 See, e.g., Julia Giese & Andy Haldane, COVID-19 and the Financial System: A Tale of
Two Crises, 36 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y S200, S201 (2020) (“[R]esponses to the global
financial crisis [of 2008] left the financial system much better-equipped to cope with the
COVID crisis while offering support to the wider economy.”).
216 Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
Remarks at the Institute of International Finance: What Happened? What Have We Learned
from It? Lessons from COVID-19 Stress on the Financial System 11 (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/quarles20201015a.pdf.
217 Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 1
(Nov.
10,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/
files/quarles20201110.pdf.
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with liquidity stress . . . in line with the past two recessions or the
global financial crisis.”218
This emerging conventional wisdom represents a false
triumphalism, though. Put simply, the financial system has not
remained stable because banks were sufficiently well-capitalized on
the eve of the COVID-19 recession. If that were the case, there
would have been no need for federal regulators to ratchet down
capital and liquidity requirements below previously applicable
levels. Likewise, it would have been unnecessary for the Treasury
Department and Federal Reserve to open emergency credit facilities
and buy up mortgage-backed securities—at least not at the scale
that those operations have taken thus far. Nor would it have been
necessary for policymakers to delay the recognition of banks’ losses
under existing accounting standards. The conventional wisdom, in
sum, overlooks the severe weaknesses that the banking system
exhibited during the pandemic and the extraordinary government
support that propped up the entire financial sector.
Indeed, the U.S. financial system has failed the COVID-19 stress
test in a literal sense, due in part to the banking agencies’ failure to
follow through with implementing countercyclical policies. The
Federal Reserve is required to run annual stress tests on large
financial institutions.219 The 2020 test was sobering. When the
Federal Reserve released its stress test results that June, it
reported that, in the absence of emergency funding assistance from
the federal government, nearly a quarter of large U.S. banks would
breach their minimum capital requirements in a double-dip
recession.220 This finding stood in stark contrast to the 2019 stress
test results, which prompted regulators to conclude that the

218 Viral Acharya & Sascha Steffen, ‘Stress Tests’ for Banks as Liquidity Insurers in a Time
of COVID, VOXEU (Mar. 22, 2020), https://voxeu.org/article/stress-tests-banks-liquidityinsurers-time-covid.
219 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 165(i), 124 Stat. 1376, 1430 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i)) (directing
the Federal Reserve to conduct stress tests to assess whether banks maintain capital levels
“necessary to absorb losses as a result of adverse economic conditions”).
220 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 2020:
SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST RESULTS 24 (2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
publications/files/2020-dfast-results-20200625.pdf (showing eight of the thirty-three
analyzed firms breaching the minimum requirement in a “severely adverse scenario”).
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banking system was well prepared to withstand even a severe
adverse turn in macroeconomic conditions.221
A major culprit in this outcome was policymakers’ failure to
implement meaningful countercyclical regulatory rules, as
envisioned under Dodd-Frank. If policymakers had activated
countercyclical tools during the historic economic expansion of the
2010s, the U.S. financial system would have been more resilient
when the pandemic emerged, and some government interventions
might have been avoided. Community bank capital requirements
are one clear example. When policymakers reduced the CBLR from
9% to 8%, the goal was to ensure that small banks would not be
forced to pull back on lending or engage in asset fire sales if they
approached the regulatory floor.222 But if policymakers had raised
the CBLR in countercyclical fashion during the past decade of
economic expansion—say, from 9% to 10%—there would have been
more room to ratchet down regulatory minimums in 2020 without
leaving small banks exposed to the risks of a more thinly capitalized
balance sheet.223 The Federal Reserve’s refusal to activate the CCyB
is yet another example. If the central bank had turned on the
CCyB—as many other central banks did—policymakers could have
deactivated the CCyB when the pandemic hit rather than
weakening the SLR.224
Some observers have wrongly contended that activating
countercyclical tools in the lead-up to the COVID-19 pandemic
would have had minimal salutary effects. These commentators
express concern about the “usability” of countercyclical buffers; they
believe that banks may be reluctant to deploy excess capital, even
after the countercyclical trigger is lifted, due to potential negative

221 See Randall K. Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv.
Sys., Stress Testing: A Decade of Continuity and Change 1 (July 9, 2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/quarles20190709a.pdf
(“[O]ur
financial system remains resilient . . . . The largest and most complex banks were tested
against a severe hypothetical recession and retained strong capital levels, well above their
minimum requirements. They demonstrated the ability to withstand a severe and lasting
economic downturn and still be able to lend to households and businesses.”).
222 See supra notes 200‒201 and accompanying text.
223 See Kress & Turk, supra note 55, at 712 (urging policymakers to increase the CBLR to
10%).
224 For a discussion of the relaxation of the SLR, see supra notes 195‒197.
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responses by regulators or investors.225 Federal Reserve Vice Chair
Randal Quarles, for example, has noted that foreign banks in
countries that activated their CCyBs generally did not deploy excess
capital even after the relevant authorities deactivated the buffer
requirement in early 2020.226 This critique, however,
misunderstands one of the essential purposes of the CCyB. The
extra buffer provided by the CCyB is a critical cushion against
losses—losses that, fortunately, were largely averted during the
pandemic.227 Banks would have “used” their countercyclical buffers
to absorb losses while continuing to lend if governments around the
world had not stepped in with extraordinary fiscal and monetary
support. The fact that banks generally did not dip into their buffers
during the pandemic should not be interpreted as an indictment of
countercyclical capital policy.
All of this is not to say that an effective countercyclical approach
would have completely alleviated the need for government
interventions in the financial system as the pandemic spread.
Indeed, even with strong countercyclical measures aimed at
dampening regular fluctuations in the economic cycle, the financial
system might not have been prepared to withstand a global
pandemic on its own.228 Nonetheless, policymakers’ failure to follow
through on Dodd-Frank’s countercyclical promise was a major
missed opportunity to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19
pandemic on financial markets.
2. The Costs of Inadequate Countercyclical Adjustments. The
COVID-19 pandemic exposed the deleterious consequences of
policymakers’ failure to enact countercyclical policies during the
See Alice Abboud et al., COVID-19 as a Stress Test: Assessing the Bank Regulatory
Framework 15–16 (Fed. Rsrv. Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2021024, 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2021024pap.pdf (“[L]arge
banks, both domestic and foreign, have shown considerable reluctance to lower their capital
levels below these buffers . . . . One potential reason for this is that banks may be quite
concerned about the response of investors and other market participants to their capital level
falling below their buffer requirement . . . .”).
226 See Hannah Lang, Fed Official Backs Using Capital Buffer to Reduce Impact of Future
Crises, AM. BANKER (Apr. 12, 2021, 2:35 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/fedofficial-backs-using-capital-buffer-to-reduce-impact-of-future-crises (“When you look at some
of those other jurisdictions that were in a position to have turned on their countercyclical
capital buffer going into this stress and then turned it down, it didn’t actually prove to be that
useful in creating the space for those institutions to continue to lend through the crisis.”).
227 See supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text.
228 See supra notes 119, 185–186 and accompanying text.
225

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

53

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 [2021], Art. 2

548

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:495

economic expansion of the 2010s. Fortunately, the U.S. banking
system appears to have withstood the pandemic despite
policymakers’ shortsightedness.229 Nonetheless, the banking
agencies’ failure to enact countercyclical policies has inflicted longlasting damage. Indeed, the absence of effective countercyclical
financial regulation has created direct fiscal costs, increased the
fragility of the financial system, and magnified long-term moral
hazard.230
First, ineffectual countercyclical regulation during the economic
expansion of the 2010s may have required policymakers to inject
more fiscal and monetary support than otherwise would have been
necessary when the COVID-19 pandemic hit. The U.S. budget
deficit reached a record $3.1 trillion in 2020, with roughly twothirds of that figure resulting from emergency outlays under the
CARES Act and other pandemic relief programs.231 To be sure, the
COVID pandemic likely would have necessitated fiscal support to
households and businesses even if policymakers had activated
countercyclical tools prior to the outbreak. The government’s fiscal
interventions, however, could have been more limited in size if the
banking system had been better equipped to extend credit despite
the economic downturn.
Another relatively direct cost emerged from the Federal Reserve,
which expanded its balance sheet at a record pace in response to
COVID-19. From the start of the pandemic to the end of 2020, the
central bank nearly doubled its balance sheet with open market
purchases totaling more than $3 trillion.232 Some of these purchases
229 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., SUPERVISION AND REGULATION REPORT:
NOVEMBER 2020, at 1 (2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/202011supervision-and-regulation-report.pdf (“Unlike 2008, banking organizations have been a
source of strength, rather than strain, to the economy . . . .”).
230 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text; infra note 238 and accompanying text.
231 Alan Rappeport, Budget Deficit Hits Record $3.1 Trillion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10/16/business/us-economy-coronavirus.
232 Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet: Recent Balance Sheet Trends,
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm (last updated Jan. 21, 2022) (showing a stark jump in
the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet from just over $4 trillion to around $7 trillion beginning
in March 2020); Jordan Jackson, The Fed’s Balance Sheet: To Infinity and Beyond, J.P.
MORGAN ASSET MGMT. (May 30, 2020), https://am.jpmorgan.com/au/en/assetmanagement/adv/insights/market-insights/market-bulletins/the-feds-balance-sheet-toinfinity-and-beyond/ (“The scale and timing of monetary stimulus from the Federal Reserve
(the Fed) in recent weeks has dwarfed its response during the Global Financial Crisis.”).
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involved unusually risky assets, such as corporate junk bonds.233
Open market purchases on such a scale also create distortions in
the pricing of debt and capital markets.234 The rapid expansion of
the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet represents one of its grander
policy experiments to date, with uncertain implications for the
future course of monetary policy and economic growth.235 The
Federal Reserve’s aggressive interventions have also reopened
questions into the central bank’s democratic legitimacy, political
accountability, and technocratic expertise.236
In addition, inadequate countercyclical regulation increased the
fragility of the financial system throughout 2020. The U.S. Office of
Financial Research Financial Stress Index—a measure of stress in
global financial markets—peaked in March 2020 at a level

233 The Fed’s Radical Policies Are Uncharted Territory, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/70a0d2ca-7987-11ea-af44-daa3def9ae03 (“Purchases of corporate
credit and commercial paper already moved the Fed into uncharted territory. The decision to
buy junk debt is even more radical.”).
234 See Michael Mackenzie, The Federal Reserve Has Gone Well Past the Point of ‘QE
Infinity’, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/11b338a2-6d0c-11ea-89df41bea055720b (“One way of looking at this is to note that the Fed has joined [other central
banks] in supporting credit markets. Viewed another way, it complicates any future exit
strategy and extends a long post-Lehman crisis legacy of distorted risk premia in markets.”);
cf. MKTS. COMM., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, LARGE CENTRAL BANK BALANCE SHEETS AND
MARKET FUNCTIONING, 1 (2019), https://www.bis.org/publ/mktc11.pdf (noting that “[w]hile
adverse effects” of central bank balance sheet expansions “have often been transitory, they
can have an enduring impact when policies are in place for a prolonged period”).
235 See The Fed’s Radical Policies Are Uncharted Territory, supra note 233 (discussing the
unprecedented nature of the Federal Reserve’s recent interventions).
236 See Menand, supra note 171, at 27–28, 55 (contesting the Federal Reserve’s legal
authority to conduct emergency lending programs); Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Wishnick,
Technocratic Pragmatism, Bureaucratic Expertise, and the Federal Reserve, 130 YALE L.J.
636, 683–86 (2021) (questioning whether the Federal Reserve’s policy experimentation during
the COVID-19 pandemic tested the outer limits of its institutional expertise); Zaring, supra
note 13, at 58–59 (expressing doubt as to the Federal Reserve’s legal authority for pandemicrelated interventions); Daniel D. Bradlow & Stephen Kim Park, A Global Leviathan Emerges:
The Federal Reserve, COVID-19, and International Law, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 657, 662 (2020)
(noting “that the Fed is influencing the welfare of people around the world in the absence of
any clear international standards or principles”); see also Kathryn Judge, Why the Fed Should
Issue a Policy Framework for Credit Policy 6–7 (Colum. Univ. Sch. of L., Ctr. for L. & Econ.
Stud.,
Working
Paper
No.
632,
2020),
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3720&context=faculty_scho
larship (urging greater transparency in the Federal Reserve’s credit policy decision making).
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equivalent to when Bear Stearns failed in early 2008.237 If
policymakers had implemented effective countercyclical regulations
before the pandemic, they could have relaxed the countercyclical
buffers and alleviated some of this financial stress. In the absence
of countercyclical buffers, however, policymakers were constrained
in their ability to respond to financial stress through regulatory
adjustments without compromising the system’s stability.
Perhaps most importantly, the 2020 regulatory response
intensified the problem of moral hazard in the banking sector.
Moral hazard refers to an incentive that insured parties have to
increase their exposure to risks when the costs of those risks are
borne by third parties.238 Federal deposit insurance is an explicit
source of moral hazard for banks, but the same problem also exists
to the extent that banks receive ad hoc government bailouts, such
as the TARP program that was used in the 2008 crisis.239 If a bank’s
executives think that the bank will be bailed out when it gets into
trouble, the decisionmakers will take more risks than if they believe
the firm would be allowed to fail.
One of Dodd-Frank’s primary objectives was to address this
moral hazard problem.240 The statute’s preamble states that the
legislation was designed to “to end ‘too big to fail’, [and] to protect

237
OFR
Financial
Stress
Index,
OFF.
OF
FIN.
RSCH.
https://www.financialresearch.gov/financial-stress-index/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2022).
238 Moral hazard is particularly relevant for risks that are hard for the insurer to observe
and therefore cannot be fairly priced into an insurance contract ex ante. See Bengt
Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 74 (1979) (“The source of
this moral hazard or incentive problem is an asymmetry of information among individuals
that results because individual actions cannot be observed and hence contracted upon. A
natural remedy to the problem is to invest resources into monitoring of actions . . . . Generally,
however, full observation of actions is either impossible or prohibitively costly.”).
239 See John Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, 25 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 103–19 (2015) (analyzing moral hazard from both deposit insurance and
ad hoc bailouts such as the TARP); see also Kathryn Judge, Guarantor of Last Resort, 97 TEX.
L. REV. 707, 709 (2019) (“How best to fight financial panics is a matter of ongoing debate. On
the one hand, concerns about moral hazard abound. When bank depositors and other shortterm creditors anticipate government protection, they have little incentive to undertake
costly monitoring. This reduces market discipline and can lead to excessive risk taking.”).
240 See Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti, Itay Goldstein & Agnese Leonello, Moral Hazard
and Government Guarantees in the Banking Industry, 1 J. FIN. REGUL. 30, 31 (2015) (“The
main goals of the new regulatory framework are to reduce the use of taxpayers’ money in the
future and limit excessive risk taking, or in other words, moral hazard, resulting from
widespread support to the financial system.”).
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the American taxpayer by ending bailouts.”241 Dodd-Frank also
enacted a set of changes that limit emergency rescues of the
financial sector by the federal government.242 Most notably, DoddFrank narrowed the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending powers
under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which the central
bank used extensively in 2008.243 Dodd-Frank also cabined the
FDIC’s emergency lending authority under its “systemic risk
exception,”244 and the Economic Stabilization Act limited the
Treasury Department’s use of its Exchange Stabilization Fund
(ESF) to backstop financial markets.245
As detailed above, however, policymakers generally
circumvented Dodd-Frank’s restrictions to provide emergency aid to
the financial sector in 2020.246 The Federal Reserve once again

241 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
242 See Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve as Last Resort, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 69, 77,
87–90 (2012) (“In sum, Dodd-Frank circumscribed the Federal Reserve’s 13(3) emergency
authority while adding several new, significant accountability and transparency
requirements for its use.”).
243 Dodd-Frank Act § 1101, 124 Stat. at 2113 (amending the Federal Reserve’s Section 13
emergency lending authority); see also Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and
Exigent Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
221, 234–60 (2010) (providing an overview of the Federal Reserve’s use of its Section 13(3)
lending powers during the 2008 financial crisis).
244 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1104–06, 124 Stat. at 2120–25 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5611–13)
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)).
245 See 12 U.S.C. § 5236 (requiring the Treasury Secretary to reimburse the ESF for funds
“used for the Treasury Money Market Funds Guaranty Program” and prohibiting “any future
guaranty programs for the United States money market mutual fund industry”).
246 See supra Section IV.B.1. In that sense, 2020 is a repeat of the 2008 bailouts, which are
sometimes considered to have extended beyond regulators’ existing legal authority. See
Cheryl D. Block, A Continuum Approach to Systemic Risk and Too-Big-to-Fail, 6 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 289, 313 n.117 (2012) (“Certain 2008–2009 Federal Reserve and FDIC
actions to assist struggling firms arguably were outside the scope of even their emergency
authority.”); Eric A. Posner, What Legal Authority Does the Fed Need During a Financial
Crisis?, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1529, 1529 (2017) (“During the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the
Federal Reserve (Fed) refused to issue an emergency loan because of legal hurdles. However,
in the cases of Bear Stearns and AIG, the Fed violated the law, or interpreted it in an
extremely narrow way, rather than refraining from the emergency actions that events called
for. The Fed and the Department of the Treasury relied on additional questionable legal
interpretations for the numerous credit facilities that they established, and in the bailouts of
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, General Motors, and Chrysler. In many cases, the agencies evaded
the law by engaging in elaborate legal maneuvers that obfuscated their actions.”).
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exercised its emergency lending authority under Section 13(3).247
The CARES Act appropriated $500 billion to the ESF and made
those funds eligible for use in the Federal Reserve’s liquidity
facilities.248 Meanwhile, the CARES Act authorized the FDIC to
trigger its systemic risk exception to backstop bank debt, overriding
Dodd-Frank’s prohibition.249
As a result of these actions, financial markets will now likely
perceive federal financial rescues as the norm going forward.
According to the logic of moral hazard, this means another round of
excessive risk-taking is to be expected in the subsequent cycle of
economic expansion. That is, market participants may aggressively
invest in emerging asset bubbles in the coming years based on the
anticipation that losses on those investments may be socialized
through interventions by the Treasury Department, Federal
Reserve, FDIC, or Congress when the next recession occurs. Thus,
the need for countercyclical regulation, which was already apparent
heading into the COVID-19 recession, has become even more urgent
after the events of 2020.

V. MAKING COUNTERCYCLICAL FINANCIAL REGULATION WORK
The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the need for effective
countercyclical financial regulation in the United States.
Fortunately, new legislation is not necessary to implement
countercyclical principles in the U.S. regulatory system. To the
contrary, the Dodd-Frank Act and other banking laws already
provide a framework for a successful countercyclical approach. The
federal banking agencies simply need to use their existing authority
to incorporate prudent countercyclical policies.
247 See supra note 174 and accompanying text; see also JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
LSB10435, THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S LEGAL AUTHORITIES FOR RESPONDING TO THE ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF COVID-19, at 1–4 (2020) (discussing the legal basis for the Federal Reserve’s
actions during the pandemic).
248 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§
4003, 4027, 134 Stat. 281, 470, 496 (2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 9042, 9061); see ANDREW
P. SCOTT, MARC LABONTE, RACHEL Y. TANG, BEN WILHELM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46329,
TREASURY AND FEDERAL RESERVE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN TITLE IV OF THE CARES ACT
(P.L. 116-136), at 1–20 (2021) (detailing the financial assistance provided in Section 4003 and
related provisions of the CARES Act).
249 CARES Act § 4008, 134 Stat. at 477 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5612) (amending the DoddFrank Act to allow the FDIC to launch emergency financial aid programs).
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This Part proposes a comprehensive countercyclical regulatory
strategy for the United States. It first recommends three
principles—automaticity, portfolio strategy, and market-wide
coverage—that should guide policymakers’ implementation of
countercyclical rules. Applying these principles, it then suggests
specific policies that the agencies should adopt to strengthen the
countercyclical toolkit discussed in Part II. Taken together, these
countercyclical strategies would help to ensure that the United
States experiences more sustainable economic expansions and less
catastrophic financial collapses in the future.
A. PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE COUNTERCYCLICAL REGULATION

To enhance countercyclicality in financial regulation,
policymakers should abide by three principles that they have
heretofore neglected. Specifically, an effective countercyclical
framework should (1) adjust automatically to correct for
policymakers’ bias toward inaction during expansionary periods, (2)
include a portfolio of complementary rules to mitigate policymaking
uncertainty, and (3) apply market-wide to encompass all financial
institutions that might transmit financial instability. This Section
explains why these three principles are essential for achieving
countercyclicality in the U.S. financial regulatory system and
thereby alleviating systemic risks.
1. Automaticity. First, countercyclical rules should adjust
automatically, when possible, to combat regulatory inertia. Post2008 legal reforms granted regulators significant discretion to
decide when to activate countercyclical tools. This discretion,
however, creates the risk that regulators will not activate
countercyclical policies even when conditions warrant, such as in
the late 2010s. Accordingly, policymakers should embed automatic
triggers in countercyclical rules where feasible to ensure that
regulatory inertia does not impede effective countercyclical
oversight.
In the wake of the 2008 crisis, U.S. policymakers entrusted too
many countercyclical rules to future regulators’ discretion. The
CCyB, for example, relied entirely on the Federal Reserve’s
voluntary determination to activate the buffer based on its
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evaluation of economic and financial conditions.250 Likewise, DoddFrank authorized the Federal Reserve to establish discretionary
thresholds for triggering early remediation of a financial company’s
distress.251
Reliance on discretionary countercyclical rules is problematic
because regulators may be biased toward inaction during economic
expansions when countercyclical interventions are needed most.
Discretionary countercyclical rules require regulators to intervene
proactively to slow an overheating financial system.252 Due to
external pressures or internal biases, however, regulators may try
to avoid the “difficult and unpopular position” of activating
countercyclical policies during an economic boom.253 Indeed,
regulators may fear immediate backlash for slowed growth or
decreased credit availability.254 By contrast, the stability-enhancing
benefits of countercyclical policies will be realized at some
indeterminate time in the future.255 Thus, “allowance for regulatory
discretion can lead to a bias towards forbearance,”256 or a
predisposition not to activate countercyclical policies. As former
Federal Reserve Governor Tarullo put it, “the structural incentives

See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.D.
252 To borrow a phrase from Federal Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin,
regulators must be “the chaperone who . . . order[s] the punch bowl removed just when the
party [is] really warming up.” William McChesney Martin Jr., Chairman, Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Address Before the New York Group of the Investment Bankers
Association of America 12 (Oct. 19, 1955), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/statementsspeeches-william-mcchesney-martin-jr-448/address-new-york-group-investment-bankersassociation-america-7800.
253 Neville Arjani, Procyclicality and Bank Capital, BANK CAN. FIN. SYS. REV., June 2009,
at 33, 36.
254 See Michal Kowalik, Countercyclical Capital Regulation: Should Bank Regulators Use
Rules or Discretion?, FED. RSRV. BANK OF KAN. CITY ECON. REV., 2d Q. 2011, at 63, 71–73
(“[T]he [regulatory] authority may face pressure from groups, such as politicians, that are
more concerned about short-term economic growth.”).
255 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Time-Varying Measures in Financial Regulation, 83 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11 (2020) (asserting that central banks’ “own risk management
strategies will tend to err on the side of measures that may stave off recessions, even at the
expense of greater risk to financial stability at some indeterminate future time”).
256 GEITHNER, supra note 121, at 29.
250
251
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faced by Federal Reserve officials create some bias toward
underuse” of countercyclical tools.257
To solve this problem, policymakers should strive to establish
countercyclical rules that adjust automatically as financial
conditions change. As Professor Patricia McCoy has written, “[t]he
most effective way to overcome regulators’ propensity toward
inertia at the top of the business cycle is to tie their hands in
advance through rules that automatically kick in when markets
heat up.”258 The CCyB, for example, could be calibrated to adjust
automatically based on a prespecified formula using a wide variety
of economic and financial data as inputs.259 Risk retention
requirements could likewise be tied to economic and financial
conditions.260 Policymakers could grant future regulators authority
to override automatic triggers when appropriate, but automaticity
should be the default approach for many countercyclical rules that
shifts the burden of proof from action to inaction. Automating
countercyclical rules in this way would make it less likely that
regulators fail to activate countercyclical tools when conditions
warrant.
2. Portfolio Strategy. Second, countercyclical regulation should
not be limited to a single policy instrument, such as the CCyB.
Instead, the regulatory framework should reflect a portfolio
strategy, in which multiple rules with countercyclical features are
applied in conjunction. The rationale for this approach follows the
same logic as portfolio diversification by investors in capital
markets: because the future performance of any particular stock is
uncertain, a superior risk-return profile can be achieved by splitting
a single investment across multiple securities.261
Just like private investors, policymakers must also navigate an
uncertain financial environment. Countercyclical regulation aims to
257 Tarullo, supra note 255, at 11. Tarullo hypothesizes that European countries may be
more inclined than the United States to activate discretionary countercyclical policies
because of peer review pressure by the European Systemic Risk Board. Id. at 19.
258 McCoy, supra note 4, at 1230.
259 See infra Section V.B.1.
260 See infra Section V.B.3.
261 See generally Matthew C. Turk, A Portfolio Approach to Policymaking Uncertainty, 49
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 381 (2022) (developing this analogy at length); Matthew C. Turk,
Overlapping Legal Rules in Financial Regulation and the Administrative State, 54 GA. L.
REV. 791 (2020) (providing a similar analysis with respect to post-crisis reforms in the DoddFrank Act).
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dampen the effect of asset bubbles and related sources of fragility
caused by upward pressures in the business cycle.262 The particular
source of those pressures, however, is difficult for policymakers to
determine ex ante.263 In the 2008 crisis, the primary culprit was the
residential housing market,264 but there is no guarantee that
unsustainable home prices will be the main source of systemic risk
when the next economic downturn materializes.
Likewise, there is no way to predict with confidence how a large
fluctuation in a given asset class or economic sector may undermine
the balance sheets of individual financial institutions. Perhaps, as
in 2008, the mechanism will be securitization activities at large
banks.265 But there are many other activities besides securitization
that could serve as a conduit instead. Simply put, just as a prudent
investor should avoid undiversified one-way bets on a rising asset
bubble; a prudent regulator should diversify the countercyclical
regulatory tools intended to prick those bubbles.
Therefore, as economic cycles evolve, policymakers should deploy
a variety of countercyclical tools from a well-stocked regulatory
toolkit. This multifaceted approach stands in contrast to much of
the existing commentary on countercyclical regulation, which tends
to focus more narrowly on how the CCyB rule is applied to bank
capital levels.266 In the event that bank capital is not the exclusive
focal point at which future systemic risks materialize—or, even
more likely, that the CCyB is not perfectly calibrated to account for
the specific form those risks take—the application of
complementary countercyclical regulations will prove useful. Thus,
See, e.g., supra notes 6–7, 74 and accompanying text.
See Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke, Bubbles, Financial Crises, and
Systemic Risk 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 18398, 2012) (“During the
run-up phase [of a financial crisis], asset price bubbles and imbalances form. Most of the time,
these imbalances build up slowly in the background and volatility is low. Initially, the
imbalances that ultimately lead to a financial crisis are often hard to detect. For example, at
first a boom in asset prices can often be rationalized by appealing to some form of
innovation.”).
264 On the role of housing prices and home mortgages in the 2008 crisis, see generally
Kristopher Gerardi, Andreas Lehnert, Shane M. Sherlund & Paul Willen, Making Sense of
the Subprime Crisis, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2008, at 69; and
Christopher Mayer, Karen Pence & Shane M. Sherlund, The Rise in Mortgage Defaults, 23 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 27 (2009).
265 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 49, at 38–52 (summarizing the role of
securitization in the 2008 crisis).
266 See supra Part II (reviewing the relevant literature).
262
263
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a diversified suite of countercyclical rules should also encompass
tools like the CECL accounting standards and early remediation
measures that were initially part of the post-2008 policy response
but never fully implemented.267
3. Market-wide Coverage. Finally, policymakers should expand
countercyclical financial regulation market-wide to address
additional potential sources of systemic risk. To date, the United
States has adopted countercyclical strategies primarily for large
BHCs. For example, the CCyB and Dodd-Frank’s early remediation
requirements apply only to BHCs with more than $250 billion in
assets.268 But large BHCs are far from the only source of systemic
risk. Indeed, nonbank financial institutions and smaller banks may
likewise exacerbate boom-and-bust cycles, and they could therefore
benefit from countercyclical regulation.
Countercyclical regulation should encompass nonbank financial
companies, which were key catalysts of the 2008 and 2020 crises.
Broker-dealers and insurance companies like Bear Stearns,
Lehman Brothers, and AIG fed the pre-2008 housing bubble, and
their collapses precipitated the ensuing market-wide credit
crunch.269 A little more than a decade later, nonbanks intensified
the 2020 crisis when MMMFs and exchange-traded funds
experienced significant outflows and dealers withdrew from
intermediating in funding markets, propagating extreme liquidity
stress.270 To date, however, the United States has not implemented
a comprehensive nonbank financial regulatory framework, and the
minimal prudential oversight that does exist generally does not
involve countercyclical strategies.271 Going forward, incorporating
See supra Sections III.B & III.D.
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 3.11(b), 217.11(b), 324.11(b) (2021) (applying CCyB to BHCs with more
than $250 billion in assets); 12 U.S.C. §§ 5365(a), 5366 (applying early remediation
requirements to BHCs with more than $250 billion in assets).
269 See Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Entities and
Activities: Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1455,
1466–67 (2019) (explaining how systemically important nonbank financial institutions
contributed to the 2008 crisis); Daniel Schwarcz & David Zaring, Regulation by Threat: DoddFrank and the Nonbank Problem, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1824–30 (2017) (discussing the
factors that caused major nonbank financial institutions to fail during the 2008 financial
crisis).
270 See FIN. STABILITY BD., HOLISTIC REVIEW OF THE MARCH MARKET TURMOIL 2 (2020),
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P171120-2.pdf (discussing the factors that
contributed to the 2020 crisis).
271 See Kress et al., supra note 269, at 1473–80 (discussing post-crisis nonbank regulation).
267
268
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countercyclical tools into the nonbank regulatory framework would
mitigate the risk that nonbank financial companies transmit
financial instability once again.
Similarly, community and regional banks should be subject to
certain forms of countercyclical regulation along with their larger,
multinational counterparts. As we have documented in other work,
all banking crises throughout U.S. history—up to and including
2008—have been characterized by the simultaneous failure of many
small institutions.272 The widespread collapse of many small and
mid-sized banks creates credit shortages, especially for small
businesses and local communities that are generally underserved
by larger financial institutions.273 Applying some forms of
countercyclical regulation—such as a countercyclical adjustment to
the community bank leverage ratio—could help prevent these credit
crunches without unduly increasing complexity or compliance costs
for smaller firms.
In sum, countercyclical regulation that focuses only on large
BHCs ignores many potential sources of financial instability. To
address systemic risks comprehensively, policymakers should apply
countercyclical regulatory strategies across the financial system,
not just to large BHCs.
B. IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE COUNTERCYCLICAL REGULATION

To date, U.S. policymakers have failed to adopt a regulatory
framework that fulfills countercyclical objectives. Applying the
guiding principles enumerated in Section V.A, this Section
recommends five specific policies to bolster the existing
countercyclical toolkit: (1) automating and expanding the
countercyclical buffer, (2) enacting the CECL accounting standard,
(3) strengthening the risk retention rule, (4) finalizing early
remediation requirements, and (5) instituting countercyclical
margin and haircut requirements. Together, these strategies
represent a comprehensive approach to enacting meaningful

272 See Kress & Turk, supra note 55, at 655–63 (explaining the “too many to fail” problem
and discussing why smaller institutions are “especially susceptible to concurrent failures”).
273 See id. at 664–65 (“The failure of 480 community banks and the distress of 900 more
restricted the supply of financial intermediation to small businesses and entrepreneurs that
fuel the real economy in normal times.”).
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countercyclical financial regulation and thereby combatting
dangerous boom-and-bust cycles.
1. Automate and Expand the Countercyclical Buffer. As an initial
step, policymakers should revisit the design of the CCyB. As
discussed above, the Federal Reserve relegated the CCyB—its most
prominent and powerful countercyclical tool—to the sideline during
the record-setting economic expansion of the 2010s.274 Going
forward, policymakers should calibrate the CCyB to adjust
automatically based on specified market indicators so that
regulators cannot ignore it during future booms. In addition,
policymakers should expand the CCyB to include a countercyclical
leverage requirement and to apply the buffer to a broader range of
banks.
First, policymakers should adopt a rule-based approach to the
CCyB to ensure that banks’ capital buffers are based on economic
fundamentals and not left to regulators’ discretion. The existing
CCyB framework biases capital levels downward because it leaves
the buffer entirely to regulators’ discretion.275 As discussed above,
regulators may be inclined to avoid forcing banks to raise capital in
the middle of an economic expansion.276 As the Financial Stability
Oversight Council asserted, policymakers are likely to be “bias[ed]
towards forbearance,” making them less likely to increase the CCyB
when granted discretion over the matter.277 This bias was especially
pronounced during the Trump Administration, which generally
disfavored higher bank capital requirements.278
To negate this downward bias, policymakers should set the CCyB
to adjust automatically based on specified market indicators. Under
a rule-based approach, policymakers would establish a formula
designed to identify periods of elevated financial sector risks. Inputs
into the formula could include credit-to-GDP ratios, real estate
prices, credit default swap spreads, and price-to-earnings ratios—
all factors that regulators purportedly consider when setting the

See supra Section III.A.
See, e.g., supra notes 70–71, 76–79, 86–92 and accompanying text.
276 See supra Section V.A.1.
277 GEITHNER, supra note 121, at 29.
278 See GELZINIS, supra note 196, at 7–13 (discussing the Trump Administration’s
reductions in bank capital requirements).
274
275
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CCyB on a discretionary basis.279 The CCyB would then
automatically adjust when the formula output—or any of the
individual variables—breaches certain levels.280 Regulators could
retain discretion to override the automatic triggers when
necessary—for example, when a pandemic hits unexpectedly. But a
rule-based system would make automaticity the default approach to
the CCyB.281
Automating the CCyB would have several salutary effects. Most
importantly, a rule-based CCyB would constrain regulatory
discretion that biases banks’ capital requirements downward.282
Automaticity would pre-commit future regulators to increase the
capital buffer when financial conditions warrant. In addition, a rulebased CCyB would enhance predictability. By monitoring market
indicators, banks could proactively build up extra capital before the
CCyB officially resets and thereby reduce the costs of adjusting

279 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 app. A (2021) (outlining the factors that the Federal Reserve Board
considers when setting the CCyB).
280 Several academics and policy experts have proposed shifting to a rule-based CCyB. See,
e.g., Kowalik, supra note 254, at 74–75 (arguing that a rules-based CCyB would “eliminate
the problem of adverse implementation incentives by explicitly stating how capital
requirements should vary over the business cycle”); Brett H. McDonnell, Designing
Countercyclical Capital Buffers, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 123, 134–36 (2013) (concluding that
a rule-based CCyB would significantly decrease the probability of a “type I error” during an
economic expansion, i.e. “failing to increase the countercyclical buffer when conditions
warrant an increase”); Tarullo, supra note 255, at 19–20 (asserting that rule-based CCyB
would “buttress[] resiliency while financial stress is rising”); FILIPPO OCCHINO, Are the New
Basel III Capital Buffers Countercyclical? Exploring the Option of a Rule-Based
Countercyclical Buffer, in FED. RSRV. BANK OF CLEVELAND, ECONOMIC COMMENTARY (2018)
https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/economiccommentary/2018-economic-commentaries/ec-201803-countercyclical-capital-buffers
(proposing a rule-based countercyclical buffer). In addition, some empiricists have suggested
formulas that reliably identify periods of elevated financial stability risks in which the CCyB
should be activated. See, e.g., Aikman et al., supra note 27, at 2–6 (introducing a formula of
forty-four indicators that consistently predicts heightened vulnerabilities in the U.S.
financial system); Drehmann et al., supra note 27, at 1–23 (analyzing how certain variables
should impact “design of countercyclical prudential capital standards”).
281 Professor Natasha Sarin has proposed a related approach in which policymakers would
require banks to automatically, or “dynamically,” recapitalize in response to market
indicators. See Natasha Sarin, Dynamic Regulation, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. 1005, 1064–65 (2021)
(explaining that market indicators should determine whether banks need to recapitalize).
282 See Kowalik, supra note 254, at 74 (“The rule-based approach would eliminate the
problem of adverse implementation incentives by explicitly stating how capital requirements
should vary over the business cycle.”).
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their capital ratios when required.283 Finally, automating the CCyB
would avoid adverse informational signals that may be sent when
regulators increase the buffer on a discretionary basis. Because the
buffer would be tied to a pre-specified formula, activating the CCyB
would not signal regulators’ concerns about market stability that
might make it more difficult for banks to raise capital.284
To be sure, a rule-based approach to the CCyB would not be
perfect. Identifying the appropriate market variables for the CCyB
formula and setting their relative weights would be critical and may
involve some trial and error. Moreover, there is only so much that
regulators can do to tie the hands of their successors. Depending on
how a rule-based CCyB is structured, future regulators could
override automatic increases in the buffer or repeal the rule
entirely.285 On balance, however, a rule-based CCyB would be better
than a purely discretionary countercyclical buffer. The United
States’ experience during the late 2010s exposed the folly of relying
on regulators to affirmatively activate or increase the CCyB when
economic conditions warrant.286
In addition to automating the CCyB, policymakers should
expand the buffer on two dimensions. First, regulators should add
a leverage component to the CCyB. As currently implemented, the
CCyB is measured as a percentage of banks’ risk-weighted assets.287
Limiting the CCyB to risk-based capital, however, ignores leverage
capital rules like the SLR, which the banking agencies weakened
when the COVID pandemic hit.288 Adding a leverage component to
the CCyB would ensure that changes in the level of the CCyB do not
283 See id. at 70, 74 (“For example, anticipating that relaxed lending and capital ratios could
lead to an increase in capital requirements in the future, banks might build up cushions of
equity capital to reduce the costs of adjusting capital ratios when required.”).
284 See id. at 75 (“[B]y tying the countercyclical capital requirements to a pre-specified
formula, any change in banks’ capital requirements would not provide any new information
that could harm banks’ ability to raise capital when required.”).
285 Although future regulators would retain discretion to override the automatic triggers, a
rules-based formula would anchor regulators’ expectations as to what level the CCyB should
be. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 23–24 (2008) (discussing the
anchoring bias). In addition, regulators’ bias toward inaction would limit the risk that they
inappropriately deactivate or decrease the buffer. See id. at 34–35 (discussing the status quo
bias).
286 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
287 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 3.11(b), 217.11(b), 324.11(b) (2021) (establishing the CCyB as a
percentage of a banking organization’s risk-weighted assets).
288 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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alter the delicate balance between risk-based and leverage capital
requirements as binding constraints throughout changes in the
economic cycle.289 Furthermore, absent a countercyclical leverage
buffer, banks might satisfy a risk-based CCyB requirement by
strategically shifting assets to lower risk buckets without actually
reducing their risk profiles.290 For these reasons, the Bank of
England has already adopted a countercyclical leverage buffer.291
The Federal Reserve should do the same.
Finally, policymakers should expand the CCyB to encompass
more banks. As currently implemented, the CCyB applies only to
BHCs with more than $250 billion in assets.292 Large BHCs,
however, are not the only banking organizations that contribute to
boom-and-bust cycles. Rather, smaller institutions can create
equivalent systemic risks, as evidenced by recurrent small-bank
crises such as the 1980s Savings & Loan collapse.293 Regional and
community banks should therefore be subject to the CCyB as well.294
Subjecting smaller firms to countercyclical capital policies need not
unduly increase complexity or compliance costs. For example, rules
could be crafted to allow smaller firms to satisfy countercyclical
buffers by retaining capital instead of raising additional equity.
Expanding the CCyB in this way is essential to ensure that the

289 Absent a countercyclical leverage buffer, risk-based capital requirements are a
relatively more binding constraint when the CCyB is activated, and leverage capital
requirements are relatively more binding when the CCyB is deactivated. Cf. BANK OF ENG.,
POLICY STATEMENT: THE FINANCIAL POLICY COMMITTEE’S POWERS OVER LEVERAGE RATIO
TOOLS 8 (2015), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/statement/2015/thefinancial-policy-committees-powers-over-leverage-ratio-tools.pdf (describing the U.K.’s
countercyclical leverage buffer equivalent).
290 See, e.g., Aaron Klein, Opinion, Risk Weights or Leverage Ratio? We Need Both,
BROOKINGS (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/risk-weights-or-leverageratio-we-need-both/ (discussing drawbacks of risk-based capital requirements).
291 The Bank of England sets its countercyclical leverage buffer equivalent to 35% of its
risk-based CCyB. BANK OF ENG., supra note 289, at 8. Thus, if the Bank of England sets its
risk-based CCyB at 1%, the countercyclical leverage buffer is an additional 35 basis points
above the minimum 3% leverage requirement. Id.
292 See supra note 268.
293 See Kress & Turk, supra note 55, at 655–63 (discussing the potential for systemic risk
arising from smaller institutions).
294 Community banks that are subject to the CBLR in lieu of risk-based capital
requirements could comply with a countercyclical leverage buffer rather than the risk-based
CCyB.
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entire banking system remains resilient throughout the economic
cycle.
2. Enact the CECL Accounting Standard. Next, policymakers
should proceed with the scheduled implementation of the CECL
accounting methodology. The financial sector has lobbied to
indefinitely delay or even rescind CECL in light of the COVID-19
pandemic.295 Canceling CECL, however, would be a mistake.
Although it may be appropriate to delay CECL until after the
United States recovers from the pandemic, policymakers should
ensure that the new accounting standard goes into effect thereafter
to mitigate the procyclical effects of future economic cycles.
Policymakers should implement CECL promptly after the
COVID-19 crisis. Congress was correct to delay CECL in the CARES
Act.296 For CECL to work as intended, it should go into effect during
a period of economic expansion so that financial institutions have
an opportunity to build loan loss reserves before the next economic
contraction. Once the pandemic passes, any further delays in the
CECL implementation would be unwarranted. When fully
implemented, the CECL accounting standard will make economic
expansions more sustainable and improve the resiliency of the
financial system.297 As economists Mark Zandi and Cristian DeRitis
asserted, “CECL will result in easier underwriting and more
lending in recessions, and tighter underwriting and less lending in
boom times,” compared to the incurred-loss methodology.298
It is critical, however, that the FASB and the federal banking
agencies take additional steps to ensure that CECL has its intended
countercyclical effect. CECL requires a bank to estimate projected
losses on a loan at the time of origination based on a “reasonable
and supportable forecast[].”299 CECL’s efficacy—and the extent of
295 See, e.g., Neil Haggerty, Bankers Urge Extension of CARES Act Reg Relief, AM. BANKER
(Sept. 18, 2020, 3:12 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/bankers-urge-extensionof-cares-act-reg-relief (noting that the Independent Community Bankers of America urged
FASB to suspend CECL implementation until 2025); Press Release, U.S. Congressman
Blaine Luetkemeyer, Luetkemeyer Statement on Federal Regulators’ Two-Year CECL Delay
(Mar. 27, 2020), https://luetkemeyer.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=40
0353 (“While a two-year delay in the capital requirements of CECL is certainly welcomed
news, it is long-passed [sic] time that FASB fully rescind the standard.”).
296 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing CECL delay).
297 See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.
298 DeRitis & Zandi, supra note 103, at 1.
299 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 115, at 2.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

69

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 [2021], Art. 2

564

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:495

its countercyclical impact—therefore depend on the accuracy of
banks’ internal forecasting models.300 Although the federal banking
agencies have issued a policy statement providing guidance on the
measurement of expected credit losses,301 banks may require more
detailed direction in establishing methodologies. In addition, the
agencies must closely supervise banks’ CECL implementation to
verify the plausibility of their models and to ensure standardization
and comparability across the banking sector.302
“CECL is not a panacea,” as even its supporters readily admit.303
Implementation may prove difficult and will require careful
supervision, but these challenges are worth addressing when the
COVID-19 pandemic abates. Once fully implemented, CECL will
help ensure that future economic expansions are more sustained
and that contractions are less severe.
3. Strengthen the Risk Retention Rule. Policymakers should take
two actions to enhance the countercyclicality of Dodd-Frank’s risk
retention requirement. The financial regulatory agencies could
implement the first reform—dynamic risk retention rules—under
current law. The second reform—applying the risk-retention
requirement to CLOs—would require congressional action to
overturn the D.C. Circuit’s decision exempting CLO managers from
the rule.304
First, the financial regulatory agencies should strengthen the
risk retention rule by instituting requirements that fluctuate with
the economic cycle. Recall that the current risk retention rule
imposes a static requirement: a securitization sponsor must retain
5% of the credit risk of any securitization it issues.305 To enhance

300 See Joseph L. Breeden, CECL Procyclicality: It Depends on the Model 1 (manuscript)
(Sept.
14,
2018),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ba5e/35dfefb20867b043b800032fb17a58ff1361.pdf (finding
that CECL lifetime loss estimates “change[] dramatically with different modeling
techniques”); see also Chae et al., supra note 111, at 2–3 (discussing models’ sensitivity to
assumptions about future housing prices).
301 Interagency Policy Statement on Allowances for Credit Losses, 85 Fed. Reg. 32,991,
32,991 (June 1, 2020) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.).
302 See Chae et al., supra note 111, at 4–6 (discussing comparability of banks’ loan loss
provisions under CECL).
303 DeRitis & Zandi, supra note 103, at 10 (“CECL is not a panacea. It will not prevent
speculation and bad loans from being made.”).
304 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
305 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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countercyclicality, however, the agencies could mandate that a
securitization sponsor retain more credit risk when the economy is
expanding. Increasing risk retention requirements during economic
booms would help constrain unsustainable credit expansion and
slow the growth of emerging bubbles.306 By contrast, the agencies
could require securitization sponsors to retain less risk when the
economy is contracting. Decreasing risk retention requirements
during an economic slowdown could reinvigorate lending and
potentially stave off a recession.307 Dynamic risk retention
requirements could automatically adjust based on credit-to-GDP
ratios, home price indices, and other market indicators like those
used for a rule-based CCyB.308 This time-varying approach to risk
retention would meaningfully improve the rule’s countercyclicality.
Second, Congress should clarify that CLO managers are covered
by Dodd-Frank’s risk-retention rule. Recall that CLO managers
successfully challenged the risk-retention requirement in the D.C.
Circuit,309 contributing to the expansion of the CLO market and the
decline of corporate lending standards in the lead-up to the COVID19 pandemic.310 As Professors Adam Levitin and Bill Bratton stated,
there is little “doubt that the statute’s drafters, if questioned on the
matter, would answer that they intended CLO managers to be

306 See GEITHNER, supra note 115, at 28 (“Regulations could be written to contain a countercyclical formula linking risk retention or underwriting standards to, for example, home
prices. In this example, required risk retention could increase automatically as the economy
grows and home prices rise, in order to constrain unsustainable increases in credit supply
that could potentially fuel emerging bubbles.”). Professors Ryan Bubb and Prasad
Krishnamurthy contend that risk retention requirements are ineffective because economic
booms cause securitizers to be overoptimistic about the quality of the securitizations they
retain. Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mortgage
Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe—From Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
1539, 1580–81 (2015). Increasing risk retention requirements during economic booms,
however, could incentivize securitizers to examine the quality of securitizations that they
issue more closely.
307 See Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 306, at 1580–93 (discussing risk retention and
securitization during bubbles).
308 See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
309 See Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. SEC, 882 F.3d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(concluding that collateral loan managers are not “securitizers” under the Dodd-Frank Act).
310 Cf. Chatterjee, supra note 141 (“Leveraged loans without maintenance covenants—
which help protect investors in the loans—increased to 80% of all outstanding loans in 2018
from 20% in 2012 while the share of low-rated leveraged loans in CLOs has nearly doubled
to 18%, BIS data showed.”).
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covered by” Dodd-Frank’s risk retention requirement.311 Congress
should therefore fix the disputed language in Dodd-Frank to clarify
that the requirement affirmatively applies to CLO managers. By
overturning the D.C. Circuit’s precedent, legislators could reinstate
Congress’s original intent that all securitization sponsors retain
some credit risk and thereby help protect the economy from the CLO
markets’ procyclical effects.
4. Finalize Early Remediation Requirements. To further enhance
countercyclicality in financial regulation, the Federal Reserve
should finalize its proposed early remediation requirements. As
discussed in Part III, Dodd-Frank directed the Federal Reserve to
establish early-intervention standards to prevent the type of
regulatory forbearance that exacerbated the 1980s S&L crisis and
2008 financial crisis.312 Despite a statutory deadline of January
2012,313 the Federal Reserve still has not implemented these rules.
The Federal Reserve’s failure to establish early remediation
triggers based on a BHC’s liquidity levels, risk management
weaknesses, and market indicators exposed the U.S. financial
system to the risk of simultaneous, widespread bank failures during
the COVID-19 pandemic. The Federal Reserve should therefore
finalize its early remediation proposal to prevent procyclical bank
collapses in the future.
Better yet, Congress could bypass the Federal Reserve by
codifying early remediation standards itself. Congress’s delegation
of the early remediation requirements to the Federal Reserve has
been characterized as “the biggest legislative punt in the DoddFrank Act.”314 Critics contend that early remediation standards
enacted through administrative rulemaking may be insufficient to
prevent the federal banking agencies from engaging in regulatory
forbearance during times of financial stress.315 Congressionallyenacted early remediation standards, by contrast, would be more

See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 128, at 103.
See supra Section III.D.
313 See 12 U.S.C. § 5368 (establishing the deadline for early remediation rules).
314 Edwards, supra note 139, at 290.
315 See id. at 287, 290 (contending that Dodd-Frank’s early remediation framework “is
prone to regulatory forbearance”); see also Block, supra note 246, at 321 (“Dodd-Frank’s . . .
early remediation rules may not significantly alter the pre-Dodd-Frank forbearance
dynamic . . . .”).
311
312
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difficult for agencies to ignore.316 Indeed, that is why Congress
established numerical PCA capital thresholds by legislation: to limit
the banking agencies’ discretion to forebear when a bank’s capital
levels fall too low.317 Congress should therefore strongly consider
enacting the Federal Reserve’s proposed early remediation
requirements—including liquidity levels, risk management
weaknesses, and market indicators—into law. Establishing
legislative triggers for early remediation would constrain the
banking agencies’ penchant for forbearance and thereby help
prevent procyclical bank failures.
5. Institute Countercyclical Margin and Haircut Requirements.
Finally, policymakers should institute countercyclical margin and
haircut requirements for derivatives and securities financing
transactions (SFTs) to constrain the build-up of leverage across the
financial sector. As discussed above, omitting nonbank financial
companies from post-2008 countercyclical reforms was a critical
mistake.318 Policymakers currently have limited legal authority to
implement countercyclical nonbank regulation given the United
States’ fragmented and ineffectual nonbank regulatory
framework.319 Nonetheless, existing legal authorities over
derivatives and SFTs represent a promising opportunity not only to
limit leverage in the banking system but also to expand
countercyclical regulation to nonbank financial companies as well.
As European Central Bank economists explained, “Financial
institutions, both banks and nonbanks, can build up leverage via
the use of derivatives and SFTs.”320 Nonbanks including Lehman
Brothers and AIG were particularly heavy users of these
See Edwards, supra note 147, at 292 (emphasizing the importance of “[m]ore mandatory
requirements and less discretion” to “limit[] regulatory forbearance”).
317 See id. at 285–89 (explaining that “PCA was partly ‘designed to limit regulatory
forbearance’”).
318 See supra Section V.A.3.
319 See Kress et al., supra note 252, at 1505–18 (discussing gaps and fragmentation in U.S.
nonbank regulation).
320 Niccolò Battistini, Michael Grill, Pierre Marmara & Koen van der Veer, A Case for
Macroprudential Margins and Haircuts, FIN. STABILITY REV., May 2016, at 110, 110.
Derivatives—such as interest rate swaps or credit default swaps—are financial instruments
whose values are derived from the value of an underlying asset or reference rate. See BARR
ET AL., supra note 32, at 1156 (“Derivatives are financial contracts between two parties . . .
with values that are derived from the value of another item, known as the underlying asset.”).
SFTs—including repurchase agreements and securities lending transactions—are essentially
short-term, collateralized loans. See id. at 1329–38 (describing the basics of SFTs).
316
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instruments to create leverage in the lead-up to the 2008 crisis.321
To protect against risks inherent in derivatives and SFTs, market
participants may require counterparties to post margin, or
collateral, to guarantee their contractual performance.322 On a
macro level, margining and haircut practices influence the amount
of leverage in the financial system.323 Higher margins on derivative
transactions and larger haircuts on SFT collateral reduce the
amount of leverage financial institutions can take on.324
Historically, financial institutions’ margin and haircut practices
have exacerbated procyclicality. When economic conditions were
strong—as in the mid-2000s—market participants set low margin
and haircut requirements in light of minimal perceived risks.325 Low
margin and haircut requirements, in turn, allowed financial
institutions to assume more leverage, further inflating asset
prices.326 By contrast, when economic conditions weakened—as in
2008—market participants sought to protect themselves by calling
in additional collateral and increasing haircuts.327 These margin

321 See BARR ET AL., supra note 32, at 1338–39 (discussing nonbank financial institutions’
use of derivatives before the 2008 crisis).
322 See id. at 1331, 1337 (describing transaction basics and margin requirements).
323 See Battistini et al., supra note 320, at 110 (“As margin and haircut requirements tend
to be a function of recent market developments, these practices stimulate the build-up of
excessive leverage and funding risk in good times, while amplifying funding stress and
deleveraging in bad times.”).
324 Id. (“The higher the initial margin on a derivative transaction . . . the smaller the
exposure that can be created with a given amount of equity. . . . The bigger the haircut on the
collateral . . . the smaller the exposure that can be created with a given amount of collateral.”).
325 See COMM. ON THE GLOB. FIN. SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE ROLE OF MARGIN
REQUIREMENTS
AND
HAIRCUTS
IN
PROCYCLICALITY,
10–11
(2010),
https://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs36.pdf (noting that “[d]uring the years of economic expansion
prior to mid-2007, there was a gradual erosion of risk management,” illustrated by low
margin and haircut requirements).
326 See id. (“During . . . economic expansion prior to mid-2007 . . . [h]aircuts fell to low
levels, and other credit terms were loosened in response to competitive pressures. This
allowed a build-up of leverage inside and outside the regulated sector.”); Battistini et al.,
supra note 320, at 110–11 (“During upturns, low volatility in asset prices and perceived low
risks lead to low margins and haircuts. When the cycle turns, rising risk awareness and
increasing volatility feed into higher margins and haircuts, leading to deleveraging and
increasing margin calls.”).
327 See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text; cf. COMM. ON THE GLOB. FIN. SYS., supra
note 303, at 10 (“In a downturn, actions taken by individual market participants to protect
themselves, such as calling for additional collateral . . . can induce further contraction of the
supply of credit through collateralised lending.”).
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calls forced counterparties to de-lever, thereby constraining the
supply of credit during a time of financial stress.328 While post-crisis
central clearing mandates for certain derivatives may mitigate
some aspects of procyclicality in initial margining, these mandates
generally were not designed with countercyclicality as a primary
objective.329
To constrain excessive credit growth and expand countercyclical
regulation to nonbanks, policymakers should enact margin and
haircut requirements that are explicitly countercyclical. Increasing
margin and haircut requirements during economic booms would
slow the build-up of leverage and help prevent the economy from
overheating.330 In addition, dynamically adjusting margin and
haircut requirements as the economy expands would ensure that
counterparties maintain an extra layer of protection in the event
that economic conditions deteriorate.331 By contrast, limiting
margin and haircut requirements as the economy contracts would
help prevent sudden collateral calls and deleveraging, such as those
experienced by AIG and other nonbanks in 2008.332 Specific
countercyclical policies could include time-varying add-ons to
collateral floors and macroprudential margin add-ons during
economic upswings, as well as “speed limits” on margin and haircut
increases during economic downturns.333

This is exactly what happened to AIG in 2008. When AIG’s credit rating was
downgraded, its counterparties demanded large amounts of collateral, which AIG was unable
to post without government intervention. See id. at 10–11, 18.
329 See, e.g., EUR. SYSTEMIC RISK BD., THE MACROPRUDENTIAL USE OF MARGINS AND
HAIRCUTS
31–32
(2017),
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/170216_
macroprudential_use_of_margins_and_haircuts.en.pdf
(asserting
that
centralized
counterparties’ risk models reinforce procyclicality); id. at 45–46 (noting that centralized
counterparties are not required to establish countercyclical margin requirements).
330 See Battistini et al., supra note 320, at 111 (“Raising margin and haircut requirements
in exuberant times . . . would also lower the impact of procyclical changes in margins and
haircuts in bad times driven by higher volatility and higher risk aversion of market
participants.”).
331 See EUR. SYSTEMIC RISK BD., supra note 329, at 59–60 (“Macroprudential tools could be
designed to increase the overall resilience of the financial system by introducing structural
changes and the build-up of ‘buffers’ for possible future adverse scenarios in the
downturn . . . .”).
332 See supra notes 327–328 and accompanying text.
333 See EUR. SYSTEMIC RISK BD., supra note 329, at 62 (identifying countercyclical tools
appropriate for different phases of the economic cycle).
328
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Fortunately, U.S. regulators already have several tools at their
disposal to implement countercyclical margin and haircut
requirements. The Federal Reserve, for example, has broad
authority under the Securities Exchange Act to establish marketwide margin requirements, which it could use to set countercyclical
margin rules for SFTs backed by collateral other than government
securities.334 The Treasury Department could exercise its authority
under the Government Securities Act, as Professor Andrew Metrick
and former Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo have
proposed, to coordinate Treasury-backed repo margin and haircut
rules, which could be set countercyclically.335 In addition, the
Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodities Future
Trading Commission could require centralized counterparties to
establish countercyclical margin standards for centrally-cleared
derivatives.336 Further, the Financial Stability Oversight Council
could coordinate countercyclical margin and haircut practices
across the financial regulatory agencies.337 These market-wide
authorities over derivatives and SFTs contrast sharply with

334 See 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (“[T]he Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
shall . . . prescribe rules and regulations with respect to the amount of credit that may be
initially extended and subsequently maintained on any security . . . .”). Under the Obama
Administration, the Federal Reserve began to develop “a regulation that would establish
minimum haircuts for [SFTs] on a market-wide basis.” Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks at the Brookings Institution: Thinking Critically
About
Nonbank
Financial
Intermediation
11
(Nov.
17,
2015),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/tarullo20151117a.pdf.
To
date,
however, it has not proposed such a rule.
335 See Andrew Metrick & Daniel K. Tarullo, Congruent Financial Regulation 27–32 (Mar.
25,
2021)
(Conference
Draft),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2021/03/BPEASP21_Metrick-Tarullo_conf-draft.pdf (arguing that the
“Treasury’s largely unexercised authority gives it the ability to initiate and drive a
collaborative effort to achieve congruency in Treasury-backed repo markets” and explaining
how the Treasury could promote financial responsibility with repo markets and haircut
rules).
336 See, e.g., David Murphy, Michalis Vasios & Nicholas Vause, A Comparative Analysis of
Tools to Limit the Procyclicality of Initial Margin Requirements 2, 22 (Bank of Eng., Staff
Working Paper No. 597, 2016), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/workingpaper/2016/a-comparative-analysis-of-tools-to-limit-the-procyclicality-of-initial-marginrequirements.pdf (suggesting strategies to mitigate procyclicality of centralized
counterparties’ margin standards).
337 Facilitating interagency cooperation on margin and haircuts would be a productive use
of the Council’s “activities-based approach” to nonbank financial regulation. See Kress et al.,
supra note 269, at 1519–26 (discussing activities-based nonbank financial regulation).
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regulators’ otherwise limited authorities to regulate the nonbank
financial sector.338
In sum, countercyclical regulation would be useful not only for
banks but also for nonbank financial companies. Establishing
countercyclical margin and haircut requirements for derivatives
and SFTs would be an appropriate first step toward ensuring that
nonbanks do not exacerbate financial booms and busts in the future.

VI. CONCLUSION
This Article revisited financial regulation’s persistent
procyclicality problem in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Academics and policymakers alike have long acknowledged that
modern bank regulatory tools create costly distortions in the
financial system by exacerbating booms and busts in the business
cycle. Although countercyclical regulation presents a promising
response to this procyclicality problem, policymakers have failed to
establish a framework that fulfills countercyclical objectives.
Indeed, as we have shown, U.S. policymakers never meaningfully
implemented countercyclical rules, even after countercyclicality
became a centerpiece of post-crisis statutory reforms and related
international agreements.
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic and accompanying recession
once again exposed the shortcomings of a procyclical financial
regulatory architecture. Going into the COVID-19 recession, the
banking system appeared to be resilient, yet it proved unable to
withstand a severe economic downturn. As a result, federal
authorities have been forced to shore up the banking sector with the
same emergency measures that were used in 2008: extensive public
financial assistance from the Treasury and Federal Reserve, along
with the waiver of baseline regulatory safeguards that were
designed to remain in place under recessionary conditions.
This Article represents the first attempt in the legal scholarship
to rethink countercyclical financial regulation in light of these
recent events. The emergency rescue of the financial system during
2020 lent even greater urgency to the need for countercyclical rules
by establishing a precedent that will encourage risk-seeking in the
financial sector as the economy recovers. The federal banking

338

See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
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agencies already have the legal authority to impose meaningful
countercyclical rules in a variety of areas. Capitalizing on these
opportunities to enact effective countercyclical reforms is a critical
policymaking challenge that regulators must confront to ensure a
more stable financial system for the future.
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